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A worldwide awakening to the high incidence of preventable harm resulting
from medical care,' combined with pressure on hospitals and physicians from
liability litigation, has turned international attention to the need for better
structures to resolve medical disputes in a way that promotes medical safety and
honesty toward patients. The civil justice system in the United States, in
particular, is criticized as inefficient, arbitrary, and sometimes punitive. It is
charged with undermining sound medical care by encouraging wasteful
expenditures through defensive medicine; by driving information about medical
mistakes underground where it escapes analysis, undercutting quality
improvement efforts; and by forcing physicians in liability-prone specialties such
as obstetrics out of practice.2 Similar charges are leveled against medical injury
compensation systems in the United Kingdom, Australia, and elsewhere. 3 While
these criticisms have been strongly countered,4 they have gained a foothold in the
1. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T.
Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan & Molla S. Donaldson eds., 1999) [hereinafter To ERR Is HUMAN]; PETER
DAVIS ET AL., ADVERSE EVENTS IN NEW ZEALAND PUBLIC HOSPITALS: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS FROM A
NATIONAL SURVEY (2001), available at http://www.moh.govt.nz/publications/adverseevents;
WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD ALLIANCE FOR PATIENT SAFETY, PROGRESS REPORT 2006-2007
(2008), available at http://www.who.int/patientsafety/information-centre/documents/progress_
report_2006_2007.pdf; G. Ross Baker et al., The Canadian Adverse Events Study: The Incidence of
Adverse Events Among Hospital Patients in Canada, 170 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1678 (2004); F.D.
Dastur, Editorial, Quality and Safety in Indian Hospitals, 56 J. ASS'N PHYSICIANS INDIA 85 (2008),
available at http://www.japi.org/february2008/E-85.htm; T. Schioler et al., Incidence of Adverse
Events in Hospitals: A Retrospective Study of Medical Records, 163 UGESKR FOR LAEGER 5370
(2001) (Den.); Charles Vincent, G. Neale & M. Woloshynowych, Adverse Events in British
Hospitals: Preliminary Retrospective Record Review, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 517 (2001); R.M. Wilson
et al., The Quality in Australian Health Care Study, 163 MED. J. AUSTL. 458 (1995).
2. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADDRESSING THE NEW HEALTH CARE
CRISIS: REFORMING THE MEDICAL LITIGATION SYSTEM TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE
(2003), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/medliab.pdf; Press Release, The White
House, President Discusses Medical Liability Reform (Jan. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050105-4.html.
3. See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., REVIEW OF THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE FINAL REPORT
(2002) (the "Ipp Report"), available at http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/Report2/PDF/
Law Neg _Final.pdf, FRANK FUREDI, COURTING MISTRUST: THE HIDDEN GROWTH OF A CULTURE OF
LITIGATION IN BRITAIN (1999).
4. See, e.g., TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005); George J. Annas, The
Patient's Right to Safety - Improving the Quality of Care Through Litigation Against Hospitals,
354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2063 (2006); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health
Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 893 (2005).
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public imagination 5 sufficient to place structural reform of medical litigation on
the American political agenda.6
One enlightened response to mounting concerns over medical error and
liability has been a partial shift in focus, in the United States and other Western
nations, from the blameworthiness of individual physicians to the correction of
system-related deficiencies in the quality of care,7 and from confrontational
litigation between patients and health care providers to a more integrative
approach emphasizing disclosure to patients and families of the underlying facts8
and apology for harm done.9 Drawing in considerable measure on Wagatsuma
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM HALTON & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA,
AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004) (explaining the success of "tort reform" advocates in swaying
public opinion); Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1465 (2007)
(reviewing HALTON & MCCANN, supra; BAKER, supra note 4; and HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS,
REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004)).
6. Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton jointly proposed a bill in 2005 to explore modifications
in the existing medical malpractice litigation system. National Medical Error Disclosure and
Compensation Act, S. 1784, 109th Cong. (2005) (discussed in Hillary Rodham Clinton & Barack
Obama, Making Patient Safety the Centerpiece of Medical Liability Reform, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2205 (2006)). Support for reform is found on both sides of the aisle. See, e.g., Fair and Reliable
Medical Justice Act, S. 1337, 109th Cong. (2005) (sponsored by Senators Enzi & Baucus). In 2005,
Congress enacted the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 as a step aimed at
fostering hospitals' self-critical analysis by standardizing, to an extent, confidentiality protections
for error reports. Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-24 (Supp.
2005)).
7. E.g., To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 1; AUSTL. COMM'N ON SAFETY & QUALITY IN HEALTH
CARE, SUBMISSION TO THE NATIONAL HEALTH AND HOSPITALS REFORM COMMISSION: INCLUDING A
SAFETY AND QUALITY FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE (2008), available at
http://www.safetyandquality.gov.au/intemet/safety/publishing.nsf/Content/I COD0866C0742129CA
2574FE00009310/$File/NHHRC-Submission.pdf; DEP'T OF HEALTH, AN ORGANISATION WITH A
MEMORY (2000) (U.K.), available at http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/
Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_4065083; NAT'L STEERING COMM. ON PATIENT
SAFETY, BUILDING A BETTER SYSTEM: A NATIONAL INTEGRATED STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING PATIENT
SAFETY IN CANADIAN HEALTH CARE (2002), available at http://www.rcpsc.medical.org/
publications/ building_a safer system e.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Thomas H. Gallagher, David Studdert & Wendy Levinson, Disclosing Harmful
Medical Errors to Patients, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2713 (2007); Thomas H. Gallagher & Wendy
Levinson, Disclosing Harmful Medical Errors to Patients: A Time for Professional Action, 165
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1819 (2005); Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Disclosing Unanticipated
Outcomes to Patients: The Art and Practice, 3 J. PATIENT SAFETY 158 (2007); Rae M. Lamb et al.,
Hospital Disclosure Practices: Results of a National Survey, 22 HEALTH AFF. 73 (2003); Kathleen
M. Mazor et al., Communicating with Patients About Medical Errors, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 1690 (2004).
9. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009
(1999); Douglas N. Frenkel & Carol B. Liebman, Words That Heal, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
IX:I1 (2009)
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and Rosett's pioneering 1986 article explaining the importance of apology (in
non-medical settings) in Japan,' 0 the scholarship in this area portrays honest
disclosure as more than an ethical and professional duty, and sincere apology as
more than a way of fulfilling the emotional needs of patients, families, and
medical personnel. These scholars, and the "Sorry Works!" movement that their
writing has spurred,1 ' also assert that contrary to long-standing assumptions of
liability insurers and hospital defense lawyers, disclosure and apology have in
fact the practical benefit of diffusing some of the dissatisfaction that leads to
compensation claims, thereby potentially shrinking liability burdens. 12 While its
likely effects on lawsuit filings are contested, 13 the disclosure-and-apology
philosophy is gaining considerable traction in medical practice. 14
Compared with the United States, Japan (like most countries) enjoys a
comparatively low rate of civil litigation over medical injury. 15 What accounts
482 (2004); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination,
102 MICH. L. REv. 460 (2003).
10. Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in
Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & Soc'y REV. 461 (1986); see also Cohen, supra note 9
(drawing on Wagatsuma & Rosett); Robbennolt, supra note 9 (same); John 0. Haley, Comment,
The Implications of Apology, 20 LAW & Soc'y REV. 499, 504-05 (1986) (noting evidence of the
impact of apology on preventing U.S. medical malpractice litigation).
11. See, e.g., Doug Wojcieszak, John Banja & Carole Houk, The Sorry Works! Coalition:
Making the Case for Full Disclosure, 32 JOINT COMM'N J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 344
(2006), available at http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/5E597FEF-6F86-480D-A1E2-
CDD6CB49ID3E/0/SorryWorks.pdf; Sorry Works! Coalition, http://www.sorryworks.net (last
visited Dec. 3, 2008) (describing coalition philosophy and activities).
12. See, e.g., Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May Be
the Best Policy, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 963 (1999) (Lexington, Ky. Veterans Administration
Hospital study); R.M. Stewart et al., Transparent and Open Discussion of Errors Does Not
Increase Malpractice Risk in Trauma Patients, 243 ANNALS SURGERY 645 (2006); see also Clinton
& Obama, supra note 6, at 2207 (describing the University of Michigan Health System program
and its results).
13. See David M. Studdert et al., Disclosure of Medical Injury to Patients: An Improbable Risk
Management Strategy, 26 HEALTH AFF. 215 (2007) (suggesting that the likely effect of more
widespread candor will be that more claims are brought by alerted patients than will be foregone by
mollified ones).
14. See, e.g., Gallagher, Studdert & Levinson, supra note 8.
15. See Robert B Leflar & Futoshi Iwata, Medical Error as Reportable Event, as Tort, as
Crime: A Transpacific Comparison, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 189 (2005). We employed claims data to
suggest that "an American in 1997 was as much as 40 to 50 times as likely (as an upper-bound
estimate) to have filed a medical malpractice claim than was a Japanese." Id. at 199. We also noted,
however, that the large quantity of claims paid by Japanese hospitals and liability insurers but not
reflected in publicly available claims statistics has the effect of inflating that ratio considerably. Id.
at 198-200 & n.35.
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for this relative paucity of medical lawsuits? The stereotype of a nation populated
by long-suffering victims with a cultural aversion to the assertion of rights has
long been punctured. 16 Are there simply fewer medical injuries in Japan, due to
the prevalence in hospitals of the strict quality control for which the nation's
manufacturing enterprises are justly famed? When injury claims do arise, are
they quickly resolved through non-punitive, harmony-promoting informal dispute
resolution processes employing the traditional social lubricant of apology, as the
scholarship drawing on the Wagatsuma-Rosett thesis 17 would presume?
Not exactly.
After a twelve-year-old girl died during heart surgery at Tokyo Women's
Medical University Hospital in 2001 due to improper functioning of a heart-lung
machine, police arrested two physicians, one for professional negligence causing
death and the other for falsification of the patient's medical records. (The first
was acquitted, the second convicted. 18) More than a dozen families whose
children had died or suffered serious injury at that hospital, renowned for its
pediatric cardiac surgery program, formed a "victims' alliance" seeking
compensation, reform of hospital safety practices, and apology for errors
committed and facts concealed. After lengthy negotiations, most of the families
received out-of-court settlements accompanied by expressions of regret from the
hospital, but no public acknowledgement of, or apologies for, negligence or
chart-doctoring. 1
9
The CEO of Tokyo's well-known Hir6 Hospital was arrested, along with
two nurses, after a patient's death from an accidental injection of toxic
disinfectant in 1999. The nurses were convicted of professional negligence
causing death, and the hospital CEO of falsifying the death certificate and failing
to report the case to police in a timely fashion.20 The Supreme Court of Japan
16. See, e.g., John Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978);
ERIC A. FELDMAN, THE RITUAL OF RIGHTS IN JAPAN: LAW, SOCIETY, AND HEALTH POLICY (2000);
FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987); J. Mark Ramseyer &
Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989).
17. See sources cited supra note 10.
18. Yasushi Tsukamoto, Criminal Prosecution Arising from Medical Mishaps: A Japanese
Perspective, 24 MED. & L. 673, 677 (2005); Doctor Acquitted in Girl's Death, INT'L HERALD
TRIB./ASAHI SHIMBUN, Dec. 1, 2005, at 28.
19. The case is the subject of a prize-winning book by a journalist who covered the story.
NOBUAKI SUZUKI, AKIKA-CHAN NO SHINZO (KENSHO): TOKYO JOSHI IDAI BYOIN JIKEN [AKIKA'S
HEART: EXAMINING THE TOKYO WOMEN'S MEDICAL UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL CASE] (2007) (recipient
of Krdansha nonfiction award). The book recounts that the hospital's internal structure and safety
practices were indeed improved in the aftermath of the highly publicized deaths and injuries.
20. 1771 HANREI JIHO 156 (Tokyo D. Ct., Aug. 30, 2001). The attending physician was also
convicted of failing to notify police of the patient's death. For a summary of the case, see
IX:I1 (2009)
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affirmed the CEO's conviction.21 The favorable ruling on the family's civil claim
that the hospital's explanation to them about the patient's death was inadequate
was upheld in the Tokyo High Court.
22
Police marched an obstetrician in handcuffs out of Ohno Hospital in
Fukushima Prefecture in 2006 upon belatedly learning of the 2004 death of one
of his patients following a difficult Cesarean section delivery. 23 The arrest and
prosecution sparked a nationwide outcry by medical organizations against heavy-
handed intervention by the criminal justice system in the practice of medicine,24
an outcry that has not abated with the obstetrician's recent acquittal.25
Preventable medical injury is widespread in Japan just as it is in other
developed nations. 26 The problem of fixing accountability for medical harm in a
way that promotes patient safety is front and center in Japan as well. Civil
litigation over medical injury has grown in Japan at a pace outstripping the
increases in other types of civil actions,27 although its frequency is still dwarfed
Tsukamoto, supra note 18, at 674-75; and infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
21. 58(4) KEISHO 247 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 13, 2004). The case is further discussed infra notes 103-
106 and accompanying text.
22. 1880 HANREI JIHO 72 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 30, 2004).
23. Obstetrician Held over Malpractice, INT'L HERALD TRIB./ASAHI SHIMBUN, Feb. 20, 2006,
at 22; Editorial, Medical Blunders, INT'L HERALD TRIB./ASAHI SHIMBUN, May 15, 2006, at 31
(commenting on Ohno Hospital case and others).
24. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
25. 16 IRYO HANREI KAISETSU 20 (Fukushima D. Ct., Aug. 20, 2008); see also Yusuke Takatsu,
Doctor Acquitted in Death After Childbirth, INT'L HERALD TRIB./ASAHI SHIMBUN, Aug. 21, 2008,
at 23; Doctor Acquitted over Cesarean Section Death, DAILY YOMIURI, Aug. 21, 2008, at 1;
Medical World Circles Wagons, DAILY YOMIURI, Aug. 21, 2008, at 2.
26. A health ministry-sponsored review of 4389 randomly selected patient records at eighteen
top hospitals that volunteered to participate found an adverse event rate of 6%. Of those adverse
events, 23% were considered to have been probably preventable. HIDETO SAKAI, IRYO JIKO NO
ZENKOKUTEKI HASSEI HINDO NI KAN-SURU KENKYU [REPORT ON THE NATIONWIDE INCIDENCE OF
MEDICAL ACCIDENTS: Ill] 18 (2006); see also Shunya Ikeda, lryd jiko hassei hindo chdsa kara
erareta wagakuni no kanja anzen no genky6 to kadai [Patient Safety Issues Raised by the Study of
Medical Accident Incidence], 14 KANJA ANZEN SUISHIN JANARU 56 (2006) (summarizing key study
results). This 6% adverse event rate is not incommensurate with reports from other advanced
nations, although differences in methodology make direct comparisons suspect. Cross-national data
are summarized in CHARLES VINCENT, PATIENT SAFETY 42 (2006), in a chart of studies from seven
countries showing adverse event rates ranging from 3-5% at the low end (United States) to almost
17% at the high end (Australia).
27. See TATSUO KUROYANAGI, IRYO JIKO TO SHIHO HANDAN [MEDICAL ACCIDENTS AND
JUDICIAL DECISIONS] 3 tbl.1 (2002) (showing a 129% increase in medical malpractice case filings
from 1990 to 2001 as compared to a 46% increase over the same period for civil cases generally).
According to the Supreme Court Administrative Office, the number of medical malpractice cases
filed in court grew from 234 in 1976 to 1110 in 2004, though filings have diminished since then to
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by that of medical malpractice litigation in the United States, and medical
liability insurance premiums in Japan are still comparatively low. 28 But the
character of the Japanese debate over accountability for iatrogenic injury-harm
causally related to medical care-is unique. Civil liability trends, though widely
remarked upon, are not central. Rather, the debate hinges around the less frequent
but intensely publicized use of the criminal law as a regulator of medical
practice. Police investigate and prosecutors sometimes charge doctors for
professional negligence and concealment of adverse events, particularly in
spotlighted cases of grave harm where doctors and hospitals offered patients and
families neither honest explanations nor timely, sincere apologies.
Japanese society has been opening up to principles of transparency in many
areas, even in the realm of medicine with its customary secrecy.29 But a
succession of cover-ups at prestigious hospitals, exposed by repeated
prosecutions accompanied by front-page reportage, has contradicted crystallizing
public expectations of candor and has fueled public skepticism about the medical
profession's once-unquestioned benevolence and competence, even at its top
ranks. 30 The profession itself, while alarmed at and resentful of what it views as
excessive police intrusion into medicine's domain, has recognized the need for
greater openness.31
Responding to an initiative from academic medical societies, Japan's
Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare embarked in 2005 on an innovative
944 in 2007. Supreme Court of Japan, Iji kankei sosh6 jiken no shori j6ky6 oyobi heikin shinri
kikan [Disposition of Medically Related Litigation and Mean Duration of Proceedings 1998-2007],
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/about/iinkai/izikankei/toukei01l.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2008).
For pre-1998 figures, see YUTAKA TEJIMA, IJIHO NYUMON [A PRIMER OF MEDICAL LAW] 137
(2005).
28. The premium paid by a physician member of the Japan Medical Association liability
insurance program in 2003 was V70,000 (US $640). General hospitals insured by Yasuda Fire &
Marine Co. paid :16,130 (US $150) per bed in 2000. See Leflar & lwata, supra note 15, at 201,
203; Kazue Nakajima et al., Medical Malpractice and Legal Resolution Systems in Japan, 285
JAMA 1632, 1633 tbl.l (2001). A well-informed source close to the liability insurance industry
who requested anonymity reported that, as of 2008, Yasuda's successor company, Sonpo Japan,
charges hospitals about V30,000 (US $280) per bed. This is a significant percentage increase since
2000, but still far less than premiums paid by U.S. hospitals. Interview with anonymous source, in
Tokyo, Japan (July 31, 2008).
29. See, e.g., Robert B Leflar, Informed Consent and Patients' Rights in Japan, 33 Hous. L.
REV. 1, 62-63, 94-96 (1996).
30. See Leflar & Iwata, supra note 15, at 195-98.
31. See, e.g., KOKURITSU DAIGAKU IGAKUBU FUZOKU BYOINCHO KAIGI JOCHI IINKAI [NAT'L
UNIV. Hosp. PRESIDENTS' CONFERENCE], IRYO JIKO BOSHI NO TAME NO ANZEN KANRI TAISEI NO
KAKURITSU NI TSUITE - CHOKAN HOKOKU [INTERIM REPORT: ESTABLISHING SAFETY MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS FOR THE PREVENTION OF MEDICAL ACCIDENTS] (2000), available at
http://www.umin.ac.jp/nuh-open /iryoujiko.pdf; infra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
IX:I (2009)
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"Model Project," whereby independent experts in specified prefectures
investigate possibly iatrogenic hospital deaths, report to the family, the hospital,
and the public about the facts, and offer suggestions for preventing similar
accidents in the future. The Model Project was conceived in the hopes that cases
taken up by the project would rarely be the target of criminal prosecution and that
the project would improve transparency within medicine, facilitate extrajudicial
resolution of private damage claims, and spur systemwide quality improvement
efforts. Beset by start-up difficulties and undermined by physicians' continuing
unease about external peer review and potential police involvement, the Model
Project has not met initial expectations for case uptake. Nevertheless, the health
ministry has recently proposed legislation to build on the Model Project's process
by creating a new structure that in essence would constitute a national system of
peer review, thereby reforming the nation's procedures for handling the problem
of medical error.32
Part I of this Article explains the significance in Japan, hitherto little noticed
elsewhere,33 of criminal law in regulating medical practice. The Article offers
reasons of Japanese law and social structure for the role played by criminal law
in medicine. Prominent among those reasons has been Japanese medicine's
accountability vacuum: the weakness of other institutional mechanisms for
medical quality control, such as peer review, hospital accreditation, specialty
certification, licensure and discipline, death inquests, and civil liability litigation.
Part II recounts and analyzes the initial attempts of Japan's health ministry
and medical establishment to address rising public concerns over medical error,
against a background of inadequate information about the problem's nature and
dimensions (Section II.A) and a problematic legal and institutional structure for
remedying the informational deficit. In Section II.B, the Article explores the
controversy over the legal requirement that police be notified of "unnatural
deaths"-a requirement interpreted by the Supreme Court to apply not only to
deaths from violent crime, natural disaster, and suicide, but also to deaths from
potentially iatrogenic causes.34 This duty of police notification of medically
32. Ministry of Health, Labor & Welfare, Iry6 anzen ch6sa iinkai setchi h6an (kash6) taik6an
[Draft of Proposed Act to Establish the Medical Safety Review Commission (tentative title)],
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/bukyoku/isei/i-anzen/kentou/dl/080613_an.pdf (last visited Dec. 3,
2008) [hereinafter MHLW June 2008 Draft Proposal].
33. 1 am aware of only five publications focusing on this topic in English-language scholarly
journals: Norio Higuchi, Article 21 of the Medical Practitioners Law, 51 JAPAN MED. Ass'N J. 258
(2008); Hiroshi Ikegaya et al., Does Informed Consent Exempt Japanese Doctors from Reporting
Therapeutic Deaths?, 32 J. MED. ETIcs 114 (2006); Leflar & Iwata, supra note 15; Tsukamoto,
supra note 18 (paper presented to the World Congress on Medical Law, Sydney, Australia in
August 2004); and Ken-ichi Yoshida et al., Death During Surgery in Japan, 360 LANCET 805
(2002) (letter).
34. 58(4) KEIsHO 247 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 13, 2004).
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related deaths, against the background that "professional negligence causing
death or injury" is an offense under the Criminal Code, has the theoretical (and
sometimes practical) effect of turning hospitals into crime scenes and doctors and
nurses into death inquiry suspects. This phenomenon has called forth a powerful
protest from medical circles, a reaction bearing a resemblance to the medical
"tort reform" movement in the United States. The controversy over police
investigation of "unnatural deaths" in Japanese hospitals also compels an
examination (Section II.C) of Japan's obscure and peculiar system for death
inquiries, a system that has hindered systematic quality-improvement-oriented
analysis of fatalities related to medical treatment.
Part III of the Article tells the story of the launching of the health ministry-
funded Model Project, which is designed to strengthen the death inquest system
and bring greater transparency to Japanese medicine. Section III.A explains the
project's workings, and Section III.B evaluates its strengths and weaknesses.
Section II.C then examines proposed legislation sponsored by the health
ministry building on the Model Project to create a national peer review system,
criticisms of that proposal from an insurgent antiregulatory movement within
Japanese medicine, and an opposition party alternative. Finally, Section III.D
considers whether recent Japanese developments might offer clues to the
redesign of medical injury dispute resolution systems in the United States and
other Western nations. The Article concludes that although institutional, legal,
and cultural differences render one nation's initiatives problematic for others to
follow, the Japanese proposals for impartial expert reviews of medical accidents
could serve as a guidepost for design of new structures for compensation and
prevention of medical injury.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CRIMINAL LAW IN JAPAN'S REGULATION OF
MEDICAL PRACTICE
A. Criminal Prosecution for Unintentional Medical Acts
Criminal prosecutions for severe misjudgment in the conduct of medical care
are not unknown in the Western world, although they are extremely rare in
comparison with the number of civil malpractice actions. In the United States,
one writer estimated the number of prosecutions for medical acts during 1981-
2001 at just two to three dozen. 35 Across the Atlantic, the number of recent
35. James A. Filkins, "With No Evil Intent": The Criminal Prosecution of Physicians for
Medical Negligence, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 467, 471-72 & nn.51 & 53 (2001) (describing nine
appellate cases, and estimating from "15 or so" to "perhaps two dozen" more non-appellate cases
during the twenty-year period of his research).
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prosecutions of British physicians for gross negligence manslaughter 36 has been
variously enumerated as twenty-three cases (1990-2003) 37 and thirty-eight cases
(1990-2005).31 Prosecutions of doctors sometimes occur in Canada, 39 New
Zealand,40 and France 41 as well. However, prosecutions for unintentional medical
acts are seldom widely publicized,42 and they are sufficiently uncommon that
they do not constitute a source of significant apprehension for physicians in the
Western nations. Nor does the application of criminal law much concern
American scholarship on medical injury and patient safety: most leading works
in the area do not treat the subject at all.43
36. The leading British medical case recognizing criminal liability for involuntary
manslaughter under a gross negligence standard is R. v. Adomako, [1995] 1 A.C. 171 (H.L. 1994)
(appeal taken from Cent. Crim. Ct.).
37. Jon Holbrook, The Criminalisation of Fatal Medical Mistakes, 327 BRIT. MED. J. 1118,
1118 (2003).
38. R.E. Femer & Sarah E. McDowell, Doctors Charged with Manslaughter in the Course of
Medical Practice, 1795-2005: A Literature Review, 99 J. ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 309, 311 tbl.2 (2006).
This review found that the number of prosecutions increased subsequent to the 1980s.
39. See, e.g., R. v. Manjanatha, [1995] 131 Sask. R. 316 (upholding sentence of
imprisonment). The case is described in ALAN MERRY & ALEXANDER MCCALL SMITH, ERRORS,
MEDICINE AND THE LAW 24-25 (2001).
40. See P.D.G. Skegg, Criminal Prosecutions of Negligent Health Professionals: The New
Zealand Experience, 6 MED. L. REV. 220, 225-34 (1998) (describing eight prosecutions for
negligence of medical providers from 1982 to 1998, and commenting that compared to other
Commonwealth jurisdictions, the number of such prosecutions was "remarkably large"). Professor
Skegg reports, however, that since the Crimes Amendment Act 1997 raised the criterion for
criminal liability from mere negligence to "a major departure from the standard of care expected of
a reasonable person to whom [the] duty applies," id. at 244, only one health care practitioner (a
midwife) has been prosecuted, and she was found not guilty. E-mail from Professor Peter Skegg,
Univ. of Otago, to author (July 24, 2008) (on file with author); see also Kay Sinclair & Blair
Mayston, Cheers as Midwife Acquitted, OTAGO DAILY TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006, at 1 (reporting on
verdict).
41. See JOHN BELL, SOPHIE BOYRON & SIMON WHITTAKER, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 233
(1998) ("[M]any negligence claims become criminal cases. Thus in 1990, there were 222 civil
claims against doctors and 137 criminal prosecutions."); see also id at 217 & n.56, 218-19 & nn.61
& 64, 226 & n.84 (examples of cases).
42. Extensive publicity has been given on both sides of the Atlantic to prosecutions of
physicians for intentional killings of patients. The best-known examples are the prosecutions of Dr.
Jack Kevorkian in the United States, see People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), and
of Dr. Harold Shipman in the United Kingdom, see R. v. Sec'y of State for Health, (2001) 1 W.L.R.
292 (Q.B.). Similarly, in one highly publicized case a Japanese physician was convicted of
euthanizing a dying patient. Japan v. Tokunaga, 1530 HANREI JIHO 28 (Yokohama D. Ct., Mar. 28,
1995), translated in TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, READINGS IN COMPARATIVE HEALTH LAW &
BIOETHICS 332-40 (Robert B Leflar trans., 2d ed. 2007).
43. See, e.g., To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 1; ACCOUNTABILITY: PATIENT SAFETY AND POLICY
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In Japan, the number of criminal prosecutions of medical personnel is
likewise small in comparison with the number of civil actions, 4 but these
criminal investigations and trials receive intensive coverage in the media.45 After
an infamous mix-up in 1999 at Yokohama City Medical University Hospital, in
which a heart patient had part of his lung tissue removed and a lung patient with
a similar name underwent a heart valve procedure,46 the pace of medical
REFORM (Virginia A. Sharpe ed., 2004); BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW (2000); MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006);
MICHAEL L. MILLENSON, DEMANDING MEDICAL EXCELLENCE: DOCTORS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE (1997); ROBERT M. WACHTER & KAVEH G. SHOJANIA, INTERNAL BLEEDING:
THE TRUTH BEHIND AMERICA'S TERRIFYING EPIDEMIC OF MEDICAL MISTAKES (2004).
One leading American scholar has addressed the issue of criminal liability for unintentional
medical injury as it affects patient safety efforts. See George J. Annas, Medicine, Death, and the
Criminal Law, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 527 (1995). Among leading British scholars, Alan Merry and
Alexander McCall Smith are two who gave the matter consideration early on. See MERRY &
MCCALL SMITH, supra note 39; Alexander McCall Smith, Criminal or Merely Human?: The
Prosecution of Negligent Doctors, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 131 (1995).
Criminal liability for medical mistakes was addressed by a scattering of other U.S. legal
writers about a decade ago. See, e.g., Filkins, supra note 35; Paul R. Van Grunsven, Medical
Malpractice or Criminal Mistake? An Analysis of Past and Current Criminal Prosecutions for
Clinical Mistakes and Fatal Errors, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1 (1997); Kara M. McCarthy,
Note, Doing Time for Clinical Crime: The Prosecution of Incompetent Physicians as an Additional
Mechanism To Assure Quality Health Care, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 569 (1997). For a recent
critique of British medical jurisprudence related to the crime of gross negligence manslaughter, see
Oliver Quick, Medical Killing: Need for a Specific Offence?, in CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR NON-
AGGRESSIVE DEATH 155 (C.M.V. Clarkson & Sally Cunningham eds., 2008) (favoring application
of subjective recklessness standard for medical criminal prosecutions).
44. See HIDEO IIDA & ISSEI YAMAGUCHI, KEIJI IRYO KAGO [CRIMINAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE]
1-2 (2001) (finding 137 prosecutions of medical cases in the postwar period, which is "extremely
small" in comparison with the number of civil malpractice cases). The pace of medical
prosecutions accelerated after this book appeared, in keeping with intensified public and
prosecutorial concern with the problem of medical error. See infra note 47.
45. The yearly number of articles about medical error in the Nikkei Telecon 21 database of
leading newspapers jumped from 383 in 1998 to 1258 in 1999, the year of the Yokohama Medical
University Hospital patient mix-up case and the Hir6 Hospital case, and to 3047 in 2000. The
number remained in the 2700-3100 range from 2001 to 2004, though it dipped to 2239 in 2005.
Yasushi Kodama, Iry6 anzen: How Safe Is Safe Enough?, 1339 JuRISuTO 67, 73 fig.2 (2007). This
count does not separate articles about criminal cases from other medical error topics, but it makes it
clear that the early criminal prosecutions provided the initial spur to the increased level of
coverage. The number of media reports spiked again in the summer of 2008 in connection with the
prosecution of the Ohno Hospital obstetrician. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
46. Three physicians and two nurses were convicted of professional negligence and fined.
1087 HANREI TAIMUZU 296 (Yokohama D. Ct., Sept. 20, 2001). Both patients survived the mistaken
surgeries. See Heart, Lung Patients Mistakenly Switched, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 14, 1999, at 2.
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investigations and prosecutions was stepped up significantly.47 The image of
squads of police deploying into hospitals to seize evidence of medical crime has
become a part of public consciousness. The fatal injection at Hir6 Hospital in
1999,48 the heart-lung machine blunder at Tokyo Women's Medical University
Hospital in 2002,49 and a botched laparoscopic prostatectomy the same year by
neophyte surgeons reading from the equipment manual and consulting the
manufacturer's representative by phone during a thirteen-hour operation at Jikei
Medical University's Aoto Hospital 50-in each of these highly publicized cases
at prominent Tokyo-area hospitals and many others, police arrested medical
personnel or filed papers with prosecutors, resulting in criminal charges. 5' In
many of these cases, including the last three noted above, medical personnel
altered patient records, deceived family members, or otherwise attempted to
obscure the truth. Often the facts were revealed only after a whistleblower within
the hospital contacted a journalist, the family, or the police. 52
47. According to National Police Agency statistics, in 1997 police sent three medical cases to
prosecutors; in 2007, they sent ninety-two. Hideo lida, Keii shih6 to iryd [Criminal Justice and
Medicine], 1339 JURISUTO 60, 61 tbl.1 (2007) (summarizing National Police Agency findings from
1997 to 2005); Nat'l Police Agency, Iry6 jiko kankei todokede-t,5 kensfi no suii, rikken s6chisti
[Trends in Number of Reported Medical Accidents and of Cases Sent to Prosecutors] (May 21,
2008) (presenting 2006-2007 statistics) (on file with author). Putting the matter in historical
perspective, the number of criminal prosecutions for medical acts during the fifty-three postwar
years 1946-1998 was 137, or 2.6 per year. For the five years and three months from January 1999
through March 2004, seventy-nine prosecutions were initiated, a rate of 14.8 per year. HIDEO IIDA,
KEIJI IRYO KAGO II [CRIMINAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE II] 1 (2006).
48. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text; infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
50. The three physicians were convicted of professional negligence. Bungling Doctors Held
Responsible for Death, INT'L HERALD TRIB./ASAHI SHIMBUN, June 16, 2006, at 27. This case was
featured in a mass market book by a well-known urologist. HIDEKI KOMATSU, JIKEI IDAI AOTO
BYOIN JIKEN: IRYO NO KOZO TO JISSENTEKI RINRI [THE STRUCTURE OF HEALTH CARE AND PRACTICAL
ETHICS: THE JIKEI MEDICAL UNIVERSITY AOTO HOSPITAL CASE] (2004).
51. These cases are described in more detail in Leflar & Iwata, supra note 15, at 192-96. Most
medical prosecutions have resulted in convictions, although the conviction rate of medical
defendants is less than the 99%-plus rate at which criminal defendants in general are found guilty.
See J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 178
(1999) (overall conviction rate in 1994 of 99.9%). Medical defendants who are convicted typically
receive a fine or probation or both, rather than imprisonment. IIDA & YAMAGUCHI, supra note 44, at
435-82 (collecting cases); Haruo Yamaguchi, Iry6jiko no keiji shobun to purofesshonaru 6tonomii
[Criminal Sanctions for Medical Accidents and Professional Autonomy], 695 NIIGATA-KEN
ISHIKAIHO 2, 2 tbl.1 (2008) (reporting four cases of imprisonment out of 253 criminal sanctions
from 1950-2007). The conviction itself, however, is usually enough to force a career change,
through either loss of medical license or personal shame, so effectively the punishment is quite
significant.
52. See, e.g., SUZUKI, supra note 19, at 63-69 (recounting letter to patient's family from
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Strong arguments of philosophy and policy are advanced in Japan against
the use of criminal law to discipline physicians and nurses for unintentional
professional acts.53 To summarize those arguments: 1) Since the acts are
unintentional, the prospect of punishment offers little in the way of effective
deterrence. 2) The severity of punishment (both as formal penalty and as
besmirching of reputation) tends to be out of proportion to the evil punished, in a
field where grave consequences may ensue from single acts of simple
carelessness. 3) Police are inexpert investigators, with little understanding of the
subtleties of medicine. 4) Criminal investigations often take considerable time,
interfere with hospitals' own case review process, and disrupt patient care. 5)
Fear of criminal liability deters physicians from undertaking risky but highly
beneficial procedures, to patients' detriment, and drives doctors away from
socially important but liability-prone fields such as obstetrics and emergency
medicine. 6) The goal of improving patient safety is poorly served by criminal
law's focus on individual blame, turning attention away from the systemic
deficiencies at the root of much preventable harm. (Substituting "civil" for
"criminal" and "plaintiffs' lawyers" for "police," the reader will recognize the
arguments set out in this paragraph as roughly analogous to those advanced by
many proponents of medical "tort reform" in the United States.)
The stridency of these criticisms reached a particularly high pitch after the
humiliating arrest and handcuffing, broadcast on national news, of an obstetrician
in February 2006 at Ohno Hospital in rural Fukushima Prefecture after a patient's
anonymous whistleblower in Tokyo Women's Medical University Hospital case). One source of
inside information for Japanese journalists is an anonymous Internet bulletin board, Channel 2,
http://www.2ch.net (last visited Dec. 3, 2008), containing posts on alleged scandals within various
Japanese institutions including hospitals.
53. The arguments are offered in various forms in mass market books, for example, HIDEKI
KOMATSU, IRYO HOKAI [MEDICINE'S COLLAPSE] (2006); by medical specialty societies, for example,
Japanese Soc'y of Internal Med., Japan Surgical Soc'y, Japanese Soc'y of Pathology & Japanese
Soc'y of Legal Med., 4 gakkai ky6d6 seimei - Shinry6 kri ni kanren shita kanja shib6 no todokede
ni tsuite: Chiiritsuteki senmon kikan no s6setsu ni mukete [Joint Declaration of Four Societies
Regarding Notification to Police of Medical Practice-Associated Patients' Deaths: Toward the
Establishment of an Impartial Expert Institution] (2004), http://jsp.umin.ac.jp/previous/
inkai/inkaihokoku/4kyodoseimei.html [hereinafter Joint Declaration]; before government advisory
committees, for example, Ministry of Health, Labor & Welfare, Health Policy Bureau, Shinry6 k6i
ni kanren shita shib6 ni kakaru shiin kyfimei-t6 no arikata ni kansuru kent6kai [Commission on the
Investigation of Causes of Medical Practice-Associated Deaths], Kore made no giron no seiri
[Summary of Issues Presented] (Aug. 2007), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/shingi/2007/08/dl/s0824-
4a.pdf; and in other online resources and medical blogs put out by organizations, such as the
Medical Research Information Center, http://nric.tanaka.md (last visited Dec. 3, 2008) and
Shfisanki iry6 no h6kai o kuitomeru kai [Association to Prevent the Collapse of Perinatal
Medicine], http://plaza.umin.ac.jp/-perinate/cgi-bin/wiki/wiki.cgi (last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
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death from blood loss during a Cesarean section delivery.54 The physician was
later acquitted,55 but his arrest, detention, and prosecution sparked protests by
physicians' groups across the nation.56 Employing the slogan "Medicine's
collapse" (iryd hakai),57 this movement called editorial and political attention to
the increasing shortage of physicians willing to attend childbirths outside
metropolitan areas and to accounts of hospital emergency rooms turning away
ambulances for fear of liability exposure. Targeted as one chief cause of those
problems has been criminal law's intrusion into the practice of medicine.58
In the face of these arguments, what accounts for the emphasis Japan has
placed on criminal law in the regulation of medical error? Part of the explanation
relates to the structure of the criminal law itself. The language of two provisions
of the Criminal Code and one provision of the Medical Practitioners' Law is
construed broadly enough to encompass acts that sometimes occur in the course
of medical practice. Police and prosecutors have simply considered it their
professional duty to enforce the law, particularly while under the gaze of
journalists and a public that is newly sensitized to the fact of widespread medical
injury and counts on the criminal justice system to expose the facts and vindicate
the public interest. 59 A second line of explanation has to do with the social
structure of responsibility for injury in the course of medical care. This
perspective concerns the need for public accountability of the medical profession
for its errors-a need that historically has not been sufficiently met by
professional self-regulation, administrative oversight, the death inquest system,
or civil litigation.60 The criminal justice system, its proceedings amplified by the
media, stepped in to fill that gap.
54. See sources cited supra note 23.
55. 16 IRYO HANREI KAISETSU 20 (Fukushima D. Ct., Aug. 20, 2008); see also news accounts
listed supra note 25.
56. A nationwide protest petition and resolution was sponsored by two medical associations.
Japan Soc'y of Obstetrics & Gynecology and Japan Ass'n of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
Seimei [Proclamation] (Mar. 10, 2006), http://www.jsog.or.jp/news/html/announceIOMAR2006.
html.
57. The phrase was apparently coined by Dr. Hideki Komatsu in his 2006 book. See KOMATSU,
supra note 53.
58. An excellent collection of materials representing this perspective can be found at Medical
Research Information Center, http://mric.tanaka.md (last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
59. This viewpoint was well expressed by Hiroyuki Ohta, Director of the Criminal Planning
Division of the National Police Agency, at a meeting of the health ministry's Commission on the
Investigation of Causes of Medical Practice-Associated Deaths [Shinry6 kri ni kanren shita shib6
ni kakaru shiin kyiimei-t6 no arikata ni kansuru kent6kai] (Aug. 10, 2007),
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/shingi/2007/08/txt/s0810-2.txt (official meeting transcript).
60. See Leflar & Iwata, supra note 15; Robert B Leflar, Medical Error, Deception, Self-
Critical Analysis, and Law's Impact: A Comparative Examination, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING
POINT 404-32 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007).
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B. Legal Grounds for Criminal Prosecutions
Prosecutors' standard charge against medical personnel under the Criminal
Code of Japan is "professional negligence causing death or injury.''61 This crime,
derived like most of the Criminal Code from the German penal code,62 has no
specific equivalent in Anglo-American jurisprudence. The rare convictions for
unintentional medical acts in recent years in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Canada almost all involve charges of a higher level of mens rea:
intent, recklessness, or (in England and Wales 63) at least gross negligence. 64 In
Japan, mere negligence is enough.65
A second ground for prosecution is concealment or destruction of
evidence.66 This offense has formed the basis for convictions for attempted
61. KEIHO [Criminal Code], art. 211 (Gy6muj6 kashitsu chishish6-tS), providing a prison
sentence of up to five years and a fine of up to Y100,000 (US $900). This crime is most commonly
charged in connection with traffic offenses, but other professionals such as architects of buildings
that collapsed and pilots of airplanes that crashed have also felt its bite. Articles 209 and 210 of the
Criminal Code also sanction negligence causing injury and negligence causing death respectively,
but they are seldom if ever employed in medical prosecutions.
62. See HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 416 (2d ed. 1999).
63. R. v. Adomako, [1995] 1 A.C. 171, 193 (H.L. 1994). See generally Death Under
Anaesthetic: The Case of Dr Adomako, 36 MED. Sci. & L. 188 (1996) (speeches before British
Academy of Forensic Sciences given by Adomako defense counsel Lord Williams of Mostyn and
prosecutor Ann Cumow); Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Presidential Address: Involuntary
Manslaughter in Relation to Patient Care, 39 MED. Sci. & L. 277 (1999) (address to the British
Academy of Forensic Sciences by the author of the Adomako opinion).
64. See Leflar & Iwata, supra note 15, at 214 n.1 10, and cases and commentary cited therein.
65. Controversy exists among academics about whether the definition of "negligence" is the
same in criminal as in civil law, or whether it targets a more limited set of acts and omissions. See,
e.g., Manabu Yamazaki, Kdzrteki kashitsu (2): Iry5 kago [Structural Negligence (2): Medical
Malpractice], in 30 GENDAI SAIBANHO TAIKEI 37, 44-45 (Sukeaki Tatsuoka ed., 1999) (setting out
differing views, and favoring an identical definition in both fields). The courts have not resolved
the issue. In practice, exercising their discretion, prosecutors choose to indict and prosecute only a
small fraction of physicians who might be sued for civil malpractice. But however defined, it is
"negligence" (kashitsu) that article 211 of the Criminal Code sanctions and "negligence" that must
be proven, not something more.
Japan shares the perspective that ordinary negligence can form the basis for prosecutions of
physicians with other civil law nations such as France. See BELL, BOYRON & WHITTAKER, supra
note 41, at 227 ("'Ordinary fault' (faute ordinaire) is the typical basis of liability for ddlits."); id. at
206 ("d~lits" defined as "less serious offenses [than murder or rape] requiring a mental element and
carrying some form of moral disapproval (such as theft, fraud, assault, etc.)").
66. KEIHO [Criminal Code], art. 104 (Shako inmetsu-t6). A related crime, for which the CEO
of Hir6 Hospital was convicted, see supra note 48, is the creation of, with the purpose to use, false
official documents. KEIHO [Criminal Code], art. 156 (Kyogi k6-bunsho sakusei-ta).
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cover-ups through alteration of patients' medical records,67 a practice that
plaintiffs' attorneys charge has been widespread in the past.68
The third basis for recent prosecutions of physicians is failure to notify the
police in timely fashion of "unnatural deaths." This notification requirement,
found in Article 21 of the Medical Practitioners' Law,69 has been applied beyond
its original scope of violent deaths, suicides, and the like, to encompass deaths
possibly caused by medical management. 70 As such, it has become the target of
intense controversy and criticism, as discussed below.
Police and prosecutors do not relish working up medical crime
investigations. They often feel out of their depth. Cases tend to be complicated,
the evidence difficult to muster and master, and the ascertainment of the standard
of care and of causal relationships problematic. Expert assistance and the
commitment of substantial resources are necessary. Acquittals occur more
frequently in medical cases 71 than in other prosecutions, where guilty verdicts are
overwhelmingly the norm,72 and an acquittal may subject prosecutors to public
obloquy and professional disgrace.73 Nevertheless, the code provisions described
above make it clear that the statutory duty of law enforcement officials to protect
the public extends into the hospital. That duty accords with public expectations
67. One of the physicians in the Tokyo Women's Medical University Hospital case was
convicted on this ground. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., HIROTOSHI ISHIKAWA, KARUTE KAIZAN WA NAZE OKIRU [WHY MEDICAL RECORDS
ARE FALSIFIED] (2006); Doctor Removed Healthy Breasts, JAPAN TIMES, June 2, 2000, at 2
(reporting tampering with patient records to conceal normal results of pathological tests of breast
tissue).
69. Ishi h6 [Medical Practitioners' Law], Law No. 201 of 1948, art. 21.
70. See infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., 16 IRYO HANREI KAISETSU 20 (Fukushima D. Ct., Aug. 20, 2008) (Ohno Hospital
case); Judgment of Tokyo High Ct., Nov. 20, 2008 reported in Atsuko Kinoshita & Makoto
Inagaki, Medical Mishaps Hard to Rule on Criminally, DAILY YOMIURI, Nov. 22, 2008, available
at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20081122TDY03103.htm (acquittal of Kyorin University
Hospital physician); see also Doctor Acquitted in Girl's Death, INT'L HERALD TRIB./ASAHI
SHIMBUN, Dec. 1, 2005, at 28 (acquittal of one of two physicians charged in Tokyo Women's
Medical University Hospital case).
72. See RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 51 (reporting an overall conviction rate above
99%).
73. DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIMES IN JAPAN 46,
107, 238 (2002). On the other hand, even an unsuccessful prosecution in a difficult case does not
necessarily impede a prosecutor's career path if the case has been well researched and presented.
Interview with Dean Masahito Inouye, University of Tokyo Faculty of Law, in Tokyo, Japan (July
22, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with Inouye], Dean Inouye, a criminal law specialist, noted
examples of prosecutors who had lost high-profile cases and later attained leadership positions
within the procuracy.
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of the criminal justice system. 74 When an injured patient, family member, or
whistleblower brings forward a charge of death or injury from professional
negligence, or when an Article 21 unnatural death notification arrives, the police
will look into the matter, and if the evidence is sufficient, they will set into
motion the machinery of the criminal process. 5
C. The Social Structure ofResponsibility for Medical Harm. Japanese
Medicine's Accountability Vacuum
Like other professions, medicine in the Anglo-American nations is subject to
discipline from a variety of sources, external and internal. Tort law-specifically,
medical malpractice law--casts the longest shadow in the United States, for
better or worse, and it plays an important role in the United Kingdom, Canada,
and Australia as well. Perhaps more important for the routine organization of
U.S. risk management activities, quasi-public accrediting organizations, such as
the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO) and the National Committee for Quality Assurance, set detailed
standards and carry out periodic on-site assessment activities to exert pressure for
quality improvement.76 Medical specialty boards carry out stringent initial
screening and require periodic recertification to ensure that practitioners acquire
and preserve the necessary skills and keep up with the field.77
When things go wrong, hospital peer review committees sometimes limit,
suspend, or revoke erring physicians' hospital privileges. Medicare Quality
Improvement Organizations, 78 state licensure and discipline boards,79 and in the
74. Interview with Inouye, supra note 73.
75. The recent intensification, described in Part III, of the controversy over criminal law's
regulatory oversight of Japanese medicine has not deterred police from investigating cases of
alleged medical error. See, e.g., Shitt5 misu yogi shorui s~ken [Papers Sent to Prosecutors on
Suspicion of Surgical Error], ASAH1 SHIMBUN (Yamagata ed.), Feb. 26, 2008, at 35 (describing
police action subsequent to hospital's internal peer review and hospital's payment of ¥20 million
[US $180,000] to family). The number of medical personnel actually prosecuted, however, is
reported to have decreased from a high of twelve in 2005 to three in 2006 and none at all in 2007.
Kinoshita & Inagaki, supra note 71.
76. See The Joint Comm'n, Joint Commission Fact Sheets, http://www.jointcommission.
org/AboutUs/FactSheets/joint commissionfacts.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2008); Nat'l Comm. for
Quality Assurance, About NCQA, http://www.ncqa.org/tabid/675/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 3,
2008).
77. See Am. Bd. of Med. Specialties, What Board Certification Means, http://abms.org/
AboutBoardCertification/means.aspx (last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
78. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Quality Improvement Organizations Overview,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/QualitylmprovementOrgs (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) (summary of
program). The QIOs' performance is not without critics. See, e.g., John Reichard, Medicare Quality
Improvement Stagnating, Senators Complain, CQ HEALTHBEAT, Aug. 13, 2007, available at
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United Kingdom, the General Medical Council,80 all serve to police the
profession as well.8 '
In Japan, by contrast, the analogous structures have historically been weak
or dysfunctional. Tort litigation, while more common than in the past, is still
infrequent at least by U.S. standards,8 2 and the sting of liability insurance
premiums is far less intense.8 3 There has been an exiguity of peer review,
8 4
although the past few years have seen some improvement on that score.
8 5
Medical specialty societies have been remiss in assuring quality in most fields of
specialty: physicians can proclaim and advertise expertise in medical specialties
and practice in them without certification, and even for specialty society
members, recertification requirements are lax, where they exist at all.86 Until
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/healthpolicyweek/healthpolicyweek show.htm?doc-id=51550
5#doc515508 (reporting criticisms by Senator Charles Grassley and a GAO report).
79. For a critical view of the operation of state-level medical disciplinary structures, see
Randall R. Bovbjerg, Robert H. Miller & David W. Shapiro, Paths to Reducing Medical Injury:
Professional Liability and Discipline vs. Patient Safety, and the Need for a Third Way, 29 J. L.
MED. & ETHICS 369, 374 (2001).
80. See General Medical Council, http://www.gmc-uk.org (last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
81. See, e.g., Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost but No Benefit: Is It
Time for a Change?, 25 AM. J. L. & MED. 7 (1999).
82. See supra notes 15 and 27.
83. See supra note 28. Individual physicians in Japan are particularly less threatened by the
civil liability system than their U.S. counterparts, because most are hospital employees rather than
independent contractors, so it is the hospital, not the individual physician, that is the main target of
civil malpractice actions. Japan has no system of independent physicians with hospital privileges.
84. See JOHN CREIGHTON CAMPBELL & NAOKI IKEGAMI, THE ART OF BALANCE IN HEALTH
POLICY: MAINTAINING JAPAN'S LOW-COST, EGALITARIAN SYSTEM 187-90 (1998).
85. Larger hospitals have recently begun instituting internal committees to investigate adverse
events. Some of these review committees, contrary to tradition, bring in outside experts to
participate. Summaries of four hospital systems' internal adverse event review systems, which
include outside experts in their deliberations, are set out in MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR &
WELFARE, IRYO JIKO CHOSA NI OITE INGAI NO SENMONKA-TO GA KAKAWATTE IRU REI NI TSUITE
[EXAMPLES OF INCLUSION OF OUTSIDE-HOSPITAL EXPERTS IN MEDICAL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS]
31-48 (2007), available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/shingi/2007/07/dl/sO726-7d 0019.pdf through
/s0726-7d_0022.pdf (report distributed at July 26, 2007 meeting of Shinry6 k6i ni kanren shita
shib6 ni kakaru shiin kyaimei-t6 no arikata ni kansuru kent6kai [Commission on the Investigation of
Causes of Medical Practice-Associated Deaths]).
86. See Naoki Ikegami, Nihon no iry5 seido ni okeru senmon-i no yakuwari [The Role of
Specialists in the Japanese Health Care System], 52 SOGO RINSHO 3125 (2003); Interview with Dr.
Tetsu Yamaguchi, CEO of Toranomon Hospital, in Tokyo, Japan (July 30, 2007) [hereinafter
Interview with Yamaguchi]. As of this writing, only the specialties of cardiac and urologic
endoscopic surgery have instituted certification programs. See Docs To Be Vetted on Endoscopic
Surgery, DAILY YOMIURI, June 28, 2004, at 2. See generally Naoki Ikegami & John Creighton
Campbell, Japan's Health Care System: Containing Costs and Attempting Reform, 23 HEALTH AFF.
19
Leflar: "Unnatural Deaths," Criminal Sanctions, and Medical Quality Improvement in Japan
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2009
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
recently, the health ministry sanctioned practitioners only after a criminal
conviction (typically for reimbursement fraud, tax evasion, drug abuse, or morals
violations); quality-of-care issues seldom formed the basis for disciplinary
measures. 87 Japan's hospital accreditation authority, the Japan Council for
Quality Health Care (Nihon iry6 kin5 hy5ka kikr), operates on a far smaller scale
and with a lower profile than JCAHO, its U.S. analogue. A central reason is that
unlike in the United States, Japanese hospitals need not be accredited to obtain
payment for services rendered, and most have not undergone the accreditation
process. 88 Systematic attention to quality control, at least until the public outcry
following the Yokohama City Medical University Hospital patient mix-up89 and
other notorious cases noted above, had simply never been a significant aspect of
the formal structure of Japanese health care.
When the realization that medical error is remarkably common and often
concealed burst upon the Japanese public's consciousness at the turn of the
26, 35 (2004) ("[L]imited but meaningful progress has been made in the weakest part of the system,
professional accountability.").
87. Interview with officials in the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, Office of Medical
Safety, in Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 6, 2004). The Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare issues
administrative sanctions to physicians, dentists, and pharmacists on advice of the Medical Ethics
Council (Id shingikai). In 2002, in response to the furor over highly publicized medical error
cases, the Medical Ethics Council adopted a policy whereby serious malpractice could form the
basis for an administrative sanction even in the absence of a criminal conviction. Since then, the
Council has issued a few more license suspensions and orders for health care personnel to undergo
re-training. This latter sanction has been strengthened in accordance with 2006 amendments to the
Iry6 H6 [Medical Services Law], Law No. 84 of 2006.
Etsuji Okamoto has gathered statistics indicating that Medical Ethics Council/MHLW
sanctions numbered 392 during the thirteen-year period from 1989 to 2001, of which only eighteen
arose from a patient's death or injury from professional negligence, a rate of 1.4 such sanctions per
year nationwide. During the subsequent period from January 2002 to June 2005, there were 196
sanctions, of which thirty-one arose from professional negligence (8.9 per year). E-mail from Dr.
Etsuji Okamoto, Nat'l Inst. of Public Health, to author (July 13, 2006) (on file with author); see
also Etsuji Okamoto, An Analysis of Administrative Sanctions and Criminal Prosecutions of
Doctors in Japan, 52 JAPANESE J. PuB. HEALTH 994, 996 tbl.1 (2005) (summarizing types of
charges, and numbers and sanctions associated with each); Tsukamoto, supra note 33, at 680 ("very
rare" for administrative sanctions to be imposed following medical accidents). See generally NORIO
HIGUCHI, IRYO TO HO 0 KANGAERU: KYOKYOSHA TO SEIGI [AMBULANCES AND JUSTICE: MEDICINE
AND LAW RECONSIDERED] 60-67 (2007) (summarizing system of administrative discipline for
physicians).
88. Leflar & Iwata, supra note 15, at 191-92. As of August 2008, 2523 of Japan's 8832
hospitals had received this organization's accreditation. Japan Council for Quality Health Care,
Nintei by6in kensaku [Accredited Hospitals Listing], http://www.report.jcqhc.or.jp/index.html (last
visited Dec. 3, 2008).
89. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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century, 90 organized medicine was caught napping, the health ministry was
unprepared, and the tort system's ability to respond had institutional limits.9' For
want of other adequate mechanisms of public accountability, police and
prosecutors stepped into the breach, employing the statutory weapons at their
disposal, in keeping with public expectations of the criminal justice system as
protector of society. Whatever the drawbacks of reliance on the criminal law as a
regulator of medical practice, and they are many, prosecutions in the high-profile
cases in the first years of this century did serve as a wake-up call to the health
ministry and the medical profession. The Japanese criminal justice system, its
workings spotlighted by the media, has been filling an accountability vacuum.
II. THE INFORMATION GAP, "UNNATURAL DEATHS," AND THE EXAMINATION
OF CORPSES
A. The Information Gap on Patient Safety
Reacting to the medical prosecutions and accompanying publicity, leaders of
the medical world and officials of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare
(MHLW) began devising measures to address perceived deficiencies in the
nation's health care safety framework. The National University Hospital Council
of Japan called on its member hospitals in 2000 to set up safety systems on an
urgent basis. 92 MHLW established a medical safety office in 2000, gradually
expanding it in the following years.93 The health minister issued an "emergency
appeal" in 2003 to require continuing medical education.
94
90. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
91. For example, there are only 24,300 practicing attorneys in all of Japan, a nation of 127
million. Japan Federation of Bar Associations, http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/index.htmIl
(last visited Dec. 3, 2008). Few of these attorneys handle medical malpractice cases on behalf of
either plaintiffs or defendants, although their number is increasing. See Leflar & Iwata, supra note
15, at 202 n.46.
92. KOKURITSU DAIGAKU IGAKUBU FUZOKU BYOINCHO KAIGI JIOCHI IINKAI [NAT'L UNIV. HosPs.
CouNcIL OF JAPAN], IRYO JIKO BOSHI NO TAME NO ANZEN KANRI TAISEI NO KAKURITSU NI
[ESTABLISHING SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FOR THE PREVENTION OF MEDICAL ACCIDENTS]
(2001).
93. The staffing and funding of this office have been thin. Personnel increased from three to
eight as of 2004. The ministry-wide budget relating to medical safety, including that for general
policy, drug safety, the operation of various advisory committees and research groups, and the
training of risk managers at national hospitals rose from 1459 million (US $4.2 million) in 2001 to
¥930 million (US $8.5 million) in 2002 and ¥1.44 billion (US $13.1 million) in 2003-rapid year-
on-year increases, to be sure, but still quite modest sums in comparison with the patient safety
budgets of U.S. and U.K. health agencies. Interviews with officials in the Ministry of Health,
Labor, and Welfare, Office of Medical Safety, in Tokyo, Japan (July 29, 2003 & Aug. 6, 2004).
94. KOSEIRODO-DAIJIN IRYO JIKO TAISAKU KINKYO APIiRU [EMERGENCY APPEAL FOR MEDICAL
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Both the health ministry and the leaders of the medical profession quickly
realized that one of the critical problems the nation faced was a giant information
gap. No one knew the magnitude of the medical safety problems that existed, no
one had any clear idea of their nature, and no reporting systems were in place to
find out. Moreover, with repeated hospital cover-ups on the front pages and in
the nightly news, the public had little faith in the willingness or capacity of the
profession itself to engage voluntarily in the honest investigation of medical
accidents and self-critical analysis that are essential for safety improvement
programs. 95
To counter this information gap, the health ministry issued rules requiring
hospitals to create internal accident tracking systems and to report, initially, near
misses and, later, accidents involving harm to an independent quasi-public entity
for enumeration and analysis. 96 While these efforts were getting underway, with
mixed success at best, 97 the prosecution and conviction of the CEO of Tokyo's
Hir6 Hospital turned attention to a separate reporting requirement, originally
instituted for entirely different purposes: the requirement that a physician notify
police within twenty-four hours after examining a corpse and determining that
the death was "unnatural."
B. "Unnatural Deaths" and Police Investigations
The "unnatural death" notification requirement, found in Article 21 of the
Medical Practitioners' Law, 98 for many years had been understood to apply to
ACCIDENT COUNTER-MEASURES BY THE MINISTER OF HEALTH, LABOR & WELFARE] (2003).
95. An outpouring of books and other mass market publications pointed accusing fingers at the
medical establishment. See, e.g., RESEPUTO KAIJI DE FUSEI IRYO 0 MIYABURO! [PUT A STOP TO
INAPPROPRIATE MEDICAL TREATMENT BY DEMANDING BILLING DISCLOSURE!] (Hisashi Katsumura
ed., 2002); KARUTE KAIZAN [FALSIFICATION OF MEDICAL RECORDS] (Hirotoshi Ishikawa ed., 2004);
JINTStJ SOKUSHINZAI: ANATA WA DO SURU [WHAT ARE You GOING To Do ABOUT LABOR-INDUCING
DRUGS?] (Jintsfi sokushinzai ni yoru higai o kangaeru kai eds., 2003).
96. See Ministry of Health, Labor & Welfare, Iry6 jiko jrh6 shish5-t6 jigy6 [Medical Accident
Information Collection Project], http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/bukyoku/isei/i-anzen/jiko/
index.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2008) (outline of current rules). The entity collecting the reports is
the Japan Council for Quality Health Care. See Nihon iry6 kin6 hyrka kik6 [Japan Council for
Quality Health Care], Iry6 jiko jrh6 shfishfi-t6 jigy6 yrk6 [Outline of Medical Accident
Information Collection Project], http://www2.jcqhc.or.jp/html/documents/pdf/med-safe/youkou.pdf
(last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
97. A brief critical evaluation of the MHLW's early efforts at setting up a reporting system can
be found in Leflar & Iwata, supra note 15, at 208-10. One of the chief problems was that the
limited contents of the reports often permitted only aggregation of the data, not the kind of close
analysis of individual cases that can result in useful suggestions for prevention of future accidents.
98. Ishi h6 [Medical Practitioners' Law], Law No. 201 of 1948, art. 21. Violations are
punishable by a criminal fine of up to Y500,000 (US $4,500). Id. art. 33-2(1).
IX:I1 (2009)
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deaths from non-medical criminal activity, sudden accidents, suicides, epidemic
infections, and the like, much like the public safety and public health-oriented
notification requirements standard in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
other countries. But in 1994, the Japanese Society of Legal Medicine (Nihon hai
gakkai),99 an association of forensic medicine specialists chiefly based in medical
university faculties whose daily work involves collaboration with police on crime
investigations, promulgated a set of guidelines aimed at broadening the
interpretation of the definition of notifiable "unnatural deaths" to include those
possibly caused by medical management. 00 The 1994 guidelines applied the
police notification requirement to "unexpected deaths related to the course of
medical treatment and deaths suspected of being so related."10' The guidelines
stated that unexpected deaths during or soon after procedures such as injections,
anesthesia, surgery, medical tests, or childbirth; deaths possibly related to
medical treatment; and sudden deaths during or soon after medical treatment
whose cause is unclear should all be subject to the notification requirement. °0
The forensic pathologists' 1994 guidelines were not binding authority, and most
physicians were probably unaware of them-until the Hir6 Hospital case.
10 3
That case arose from a patient's death in 1999 at a well-known Tokyo
hospital after a nurse injected her with what the nurse thought was a heparin
solution. In fact, the syringe contained a toxic disinfectant and had been left on
the cart by another nurse. Following a decision reached the next day by a hospital
committee, the hospital CEO ordered the death certificate to be falsified and sent
no notification to the police for eleven days. He was prosecuted and convicted for
both deliberate acts.104 The Supreme Court of Japan affirmed his conviction for
99. See Japanese Society of Legal Medicine, http://plaza.umin.ac.jp/legahmed/index.en.html
(last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
100. The perceived need for such an interpretation was sparked in part by the controversy over
heart transplantations from patients judged to be brain dead. The story of the national debate over
whether the first such heart transplant in Japan was medically justified or whether it implicated
"unnatural deaths"-a criminal abuse of an ambitious transplant surgeon's position in his quest for
worldwide glory-is ably recounted in FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 82-109, 131-40; and MARGARET
LOCK, TWICE DEAD: ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND THE REINVENTION OF DEATH 130-46 (2002).
101. Nihon hrigakkai "U'6shi" gaidorain [Japanese Society of Legal Medicine "Unnatural
Death " Guidelines], 48 NIHON HOIGAKU ZASSHi 357 (1994).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Toshiharu Furukawa, Shinry6 ni kanren shita "ijtshi" ni tsuite [On "Unnatural
Deaths" Related to Medical Practice], 102 NIHON GEKA GAKKAI ZASSHI 554 (2001); Yoshiki
Ogawa, Iry5 jiko to ishi no todokede gimu [Medical Accidents and Physicians' Duty of
Notification], 3 KEIJIHO JANARU 40, 42 & n.6 (2006).
104. 1771 HANREI JIHO 156 (Tokyo D. Ct., Aug. 30, 2001). The two nurses were convicted of
professional negligence and received suspended sentences. The attending physician was convicted
of violating Article 21 and received a fine and license suspension. None of these defendants
appealed their convictions. A Tokyo metropolitan hospital bureau official, who was advised of the
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violating the Article 21 requirement of notification within twenty-four hours,
rejecting his contention that the requirement to notify police on pain of a criminal
fine violated the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 0 5 In
upholding the conviction, the Court recognized that the Article 21 "unnatural
death" notification requirement could properly be applied to at least some
iatrogenic deaths.
The Hir6 Hospital CEO's conviction sent earthquake shocks through
Japanese medicine. 106 A great many patients die in hospitals. Which of these
deaths should be considered "unnatural" and therefore notifiable to police?
Would a reluctance to contact police, if an iatrogenic death later somehow comes
to light, intensify the public's criticism of the medical profession for concealing
its mistakes? On the other hand, would a practice of routine notification to police
of every case of possible malpractice, as a health ministry guidance manual
seemed to recommend, 10 7 have the effect of inviting police investigators into
hospitals for fishing expeditions, disrupting patient care and subjecting doctors
and nurses to the threat of prosecution for professional negligence?
The Japan Surgical Society, 0 8 one of the two largest and most influential
medical specialty organizations, took the view that some kind of reporting to
outside authority was advisable. The surgeons' group issued a somewhat
muddled position paper (before the Supreme Court decision in the Hir6 Hospital
case) contesting the idea that Article 21 requires notification of deaths possibly
connected to medical management. The Surgical Society's position paper
advanced the idea that deaths caused by foreseeable complications related to
surgery performed with appropriate informed consent should not be considered
"unnatural," but nevertheless called on its members as an ethical matter
voluntarily to send "reports" (as distinguished from notifications) to police or to
some other independent entity, when there is clear malpractice or strong
suspicion of serious malpractice, resulting either in death or in serious injury. 109
death but did not notify police, was found not guilty. For a summary of the case, see Tsukamoto,
supra note 18, at 674-75.
105. 58(4) KEISHO 247 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 13, 2004). The hospital CEO did not appeal his
conviction for falsifying the death certificate. A good summary of the case and its implications is to
be found in Ogawa, supra note 103.
106. See, e.g., Tsukamoto, supra note 18.
107. K6seish6 hoken iry6-kyoku kokuritsu byrin-bu risuku maneijimento sutandaado manyuaru
sakusei iinkai [Ministry of Health, Labor & Welfare Health Ins. Bureau, Nat'l Hosps. Office, Risk
Management Standard Manual Drafting Comm.], Risuku maneijimento manyuaru sakusei shishin
[Guide for Drafting Risk Management Manuals] (2000), available at
http://wwwl.mhlw.go.jp/topics/sisin/tpll02-1_12.html ("The director of the facility is to notify
local police quickly of cases of death or injury resulting from or suspected to have resulted from
medical malpractice.").
108. See Japan Surgical Society, http://www.jssoc.or.jp (last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
109. Nihon geka gakkai [Japan Surgical Soc'y], Shinry6 k6i ni kanren shita kanja no shib5,
IX:I (2009)
24
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 9 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol9/iss1/1
"UNNATURAL DEATHS"
After the Supreme Court's decision in the Hir6 Hospital case, the prestigious
Science Council of Japan followed with a report acknowledging, like the Japan
Surgical Society position paper, the importance of promoting the transparency in
health care that the public is coming to expect, but calling for communicating
accident information to police on a more limited basis. Deaths clearly the result
of medical negligence should be notifiable, stated the Science Council, but those
where negligence is less clear should first be reviewed by experts before
determining whether police should be notified.110 Other organizations issued still
different guidelines. Among doctors, hospital administrators, and their legal
advisors, confusion has reigned."l'
C. Japan's Problematic Death Inquest System
Adding to the confusion is Japan's splintered, underdeveloped system for
death inquests, a structure hindering systematic quality-improvement-oriented
analysis of fatalities related to medical treatment. As leading forensic pathologist
Tatsuya Fujimiya observed, the Japanese death inquest system "does not
investigate... non-criminal death in any depth" and fails to focus on prevention
of future accidents.' 12 The following overview of the death inquest system
shdgai no hdkoku ni tsuite (Reporting Medical Practice-Associated Deaths and Injuries], reprinted
in Hiroyuki Kat6, Iry6 jiko jdhd no hdkoku no mondaiten [Issues in Reporting Medical Accident
Information], 1249 JURIST 69, 70-71 (2003).
110. NIHON GAKUJUTSU KAIGI [SCI. COUNCIL OF JAPAN], IJOSHI-TO NI TSUITE - NIHON GAKUJUTSU
KAIGI NO KENKAI TO TEIGEN [UNNATURAL DEATHS ETC. - OPINION AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
SCIENCE COUNCIL OF JAPAN] (2005), available at http://www.scj.go.jp/ja/info/kohyo/pdf/kohyo- 19-
t1030-7.pdf.
111. See Yasushi Kodama, Ishih6 21-j6 o meguru konmei [The Confusion Surrounding Article
21 of the Medical Practitioners'Law], 1249 JURIST 72 (2003); Norio Higuchi, Iry6 ni okeru kihan
to sofuto r6 [Norms and Soft Law in Medicine], 1 SOFT LAW J. 39, 51-53 (2005) (hypothetical case
illustrating potential for confusion); Tsukamoto, supra note 18, at 677.
According to one survey, many physicians are under the erroneous impression that a
medically related death need not be reported to police as long as the patient gave informed consent
to the procedure involved, or if the reasons for the death were explained to the family. Ikegaya et
al., supra note 33.
One count on which the Ohno Hospital obstetrician was recently acquitted was an alleged
Article 21 violation. The district court found that since the patient's death during Cesarean section
delivery was not proven to have been caused by negligence, it was not an "unnatural" death, so
notification of police was not required. 16 IRYO HANREI KAISETSU 20 (Fukushima D. Ct., Aug. 20,
2008). Whether other courts will accept the apparent link between negligence and "unnaturalness"
remains to be seen.
112. Tatsuya Fujimiya, Legal Medicine and the Death Inquiry System in Japan: Their
Development and a Comparative Study, in MEDICINE AND THE LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, EAST AND WEST 129,
152, 156 (Yasuo Otsuka & Shizu Sakai eds., 1998) (article from a 1994 symposium); see also
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examines the problems of that system from a patient safety standpoint-problems
that the health ministry's "Model Project" and proposed legislative reform,
addressed in Part III of this Article, are designed to ameliorate.
Autopsies are conducted in a considerably smaller proportion of all deaths in
Japan than in the United States or other Western nations. 13 They are performed
by members of two rival specialties, clinical pathology (byrrigaku) and forensic
pathology (higaku). Clinical pathologists, typically hospital employees, conduct
hospital autopsies in cases where there is no question of "unnatural death"-the
majority of cases. Forensic pathologists, who are usually based in university
medical faculties or local medical examiners' offices, perform medicolegal
autopsies when a death might be classed as "unnatural."
'1 14
Medicolegal autopsies, the kind performed by forensic pathologists, fall into
two classes: judicial autopsies (shih6 kaib5) for cases determined to be criminal
or for which criminal investigation is required, and non-judicial autopsies for
what are considered "public health" purposes. The non-judicial autopsies are split
again, depending on where they take place: administrative autopsies (gyrsei
kaib6) in a few urban areas with medical examiner systems set up under the post-
World War II American occupation, and "consented autopsies" (shadaku kaib5)
in the rest of Japan.115
Tsukamoto, supra note 18, at 678 ("[T]he medical examiner system in Japan is far from
satisfactory.").
113. A 1998 World Health Organization survey placed Japan's autopsy rate lowest among
twenty-two developed nations, at 4% compared to 12% in the United States, 20% in Canada, 24%
in the United Kingdom, and 37% in Sweden. See Etsuo Okazaki, Anzen na iry6 o kizuku ue de no
byrrii no yakuwari [The Role of Pathologists in Building Safe Medical Care], 34 GENDAI IRYO 904,
905 fig. 1 (2002); see also Stephen J. McPhee, Maximizing the Benefits of Autopsy for Clinicians
and Families: What Needs To Be Done, 120 ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY LABORATORY MED. 743, 744
(1996) (estimating the overall rate in the United States at 10-12%). More recent single-nation data
place Japan's autopsy rate even lower, at 3.1%, see infra note 114, compared with the rate in
England and Wales of 22%, see NAT'L CONFIDENTIAL ENQUIRY INTO PATIENT OUTCOME AND
DEATH, THE CORONER'S AUTOPSY: Do WE DESERVE BETTER?, 6 (2006), available at
http://www.ncepod.org.uk/2006Report/introduction.html.
114. In 2005, medicolegal autopsies were performed in 13,570 cases. KEISATSUCHO [NAT'L
POLICE AGENCY], HEISEI 19-NEN-CHO TODOFUKEN-BETSU SHITAI SHUSOSO [AUTOPSIES HANDLED, BY
PREFECTURE] (2007). Hospital autopsies were performed in 19,337 cases. NIHON BYORI GAKKAI
[JAPANESE SOCIETY OF PATHOLOGY], 48 NIHON BYORI BOKEN SHUHO [ANNUAL OF PATHOLOGICAL
AUTOPSY CASES IN JAPAN] 1007 (2006). Together, these autopsies constitute 3.1% of the 1,083,796
total deaths in Japan for that year. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR & WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS OF
JAPAN 139 (2006) (data on file with author).
115. The best explanation of this convoluted system is found in Ken-ichi Nakane, Wagakuni no
kenshi seido [Japan's Death Inquest System], 2007 REFUARENSU 96. The brief description
presented here generally follows the structure of Nakane's analysis, although not all the critical
comments should be attributed to him. For English-language descriptions of the system, see
IX:I1 (2009)
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When a death is criminal or suspected as such by the initial police
inspection, the case is handled in uniform fashion throughout Japan. The police
or prosecutor may apply to the district court for a judicial autopsy.1 16 Judicial
autopsies are conducted at national expense, typically by forensic pathologists.
117
Consent of the next of kin is not required. The focus is on evidence of crime, so
seldom does the judicial autopsy result in a precise determination of non-criminal
causes of death possibly related to medical management.' 18 Even if the autopsy
report were to contain such information, neither the family nor the hospital is
typically allowed access during the police investigation, which may take months
or years. 1 9 If the case is dropped, the autopsy report usually remains permanently
inaccessible.
20
In contrast to the unified system for criminal death investigations, inquiries
into deaths of unknown cause for which criminal investigation is not required
differ considerably from one jurisdiction to another. Among the five urban
prefectures with medical examiners' offices, three (Tokyo, Osaka, and Hyogo)
carry out significant numbers of administrative autopsies. 2 ' These medical
examiners' offices, which have authority over about one-tenth of deaths
nationwide,12 2 are independent of the police and conduct autopsies, at prefectural
expense, for public health purposes. 123 These autopsies require neither judicial
authorization nor family consent. Practice regarding disclosure of administrative
Fujimiya, supra note 112; and Ken-ichi Yoshida, Report of Unusual Deaths and the Postmortem
Inspection System, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC AND LEGAL MEDICINE 123 (2005).
116. KEIJI SOHO HO [Code of Criminal Procedure], arts. 225 & 229.
117. Police pay roughly :V250,000-300,000 (US $2300-2800) for a judicial autopsy. Interview
with Professor Ken-ichi Yoshida, Univ. of Tokyo Faculty of Med., in Tokyo, Japan (July 16, 2008)
[hereinafter 2008 Interview with Yoshida].
118. See Fujimiya, supra note 112, at 147-52; Yoshida, supra note 115, at 126-27.
119. E.g., Masahiko Idegawa, Shiino shiraberu (3): Keii shih6 no genkai - kaib6 kiroku kaiji
made 3-nen [Death Investigations (3): The Limits of Criminal Justice - 3 Years Until Disclosure of
Autopsy Record], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Sept. 16, 2005, at 3 (reporting Hyogo case in which the
prosecution delayed family access to autopsy results adverse to the hospital).
120. See Fujimiya, supra note 112, at 153; Ikegaya et al., supra note 33, at 116; Ry6ko
Hatanaka, Wagakuni ni okeru iry6 jiko chfsa taisei no genzai [The Current Structure of Medical
Accident Investigations in Japan], Medical Accident Information Center Symposium, Nagoya,
Japan (May 27, 2006).
121. Nakane, supra note 115, at 110-13. The other two medical examiners' offices, in
Kanagawa Prefecture (Yokohama area) and Aichi Prefecture (Nagoya area), are scarcely
functioning. Id. at 111-12 & nn.60-65.
122. STATISTICS AND INFO. DEP'T, MINISTRY OF HEALTH & WELFARE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS
ON HEALTH AND WELFARE IN JAPAN 2004, at 31 (2005).
123. Administrative autopsies are carried out under authority of the Shitai kaib6 hozon h6
[Corpse Autopsy Preservation Law], Law No. 204 of 1949, art. 8.
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autopsy reports to the families and hospitals involved apparently varies.12 4
All other areas of Japan lack well-functioning medical examiners' offices,
and in these regions death inquests outside the criminal sphere are carried out
under a rickety system whose results vary considerably. After a police inspection
finds that a death case does not require criminal handling, a police surgeon
(keisatsui) typically enters "natural death" on the death certificate, and that is the
end of the matter. The police surgeon is usually a general practitioner on contract
with the police, 25 too often lacking forensic expertise 126 and without much
interest in exploring possible non-criminal death causes. In these regions without
medical examiners' offices, non-judicial medicolegal autopsies may be
conducted only with the family's consent. 127 But for cultural reasons there is
considerable resistance among the bereaved to sullying a family corpse. 28 So
these "consented autopsies" (sh5daku kaib6) are often difficult to arrange.
One result of this splintered death inquest system is that the performance of
non-judicial medicolegal autopsies for public health purposes is a relatively rare
event in most of Japan-the areas lacking well-functioning medical examiner
systems. a9 Imprecise cause-of-death determinations are said to be especially
124. See HIDEAKI SHIROYAMA ET AL., SHINRYO KOI NI KANREN SHITA SHIBO NO CHOSA BUNSEKI
MODERU JIGYO NO HO-SEIDO TO UNYO NI KAN-SURU KENKY0 [THE OPERATION AND LEGAL
STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL PROJECT FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE-
ASSOCIATED DEATHS] 5-8 (2006) (reporting disclosure of autopsy results in Osaka and Hyogo; no
information on Tokyo); Interview with Professor Ken-ichi Yoshida, Univ. of Tokyo Faculty of
Med., in Tokyo, Japan (July 17, 2007) (reporting nondisclosure of autopsy results in some cases in
Tokyo) [hereinafter 2007 Interview with Yoshida]; Interview with Dr. Takashi Nagata, in Tokyo,
Japan (Aug. 3, 2007) (same).
125. Fujimiya, supra note 112, at 147, 153, 154.
126. See Yoshida, supra note 115, at 124 (police surgeons have "usually not experienced
forensic practice").
127. Shitai kaib6 hozon h6 [Corpse Autopsy Preservation Law], Law No. 204 of 1949, art. 7.
128. Prominent among these reasons is the desire to bring the body from the hospital for
Buddhist funeral services. See, e.g., LOCK, supra note 100, at 306-09 (anthropologist's exploration
of public resistance in Japan to dissections); Fujimiya, supra note 112, at 148, 153-54.
Among East Asian societies, Japan is not the most resistant to the performance of
autopsies. The autopsy rate in the Republic of Korea is considerably lower. Interview with Masashi
Fukayama, Univ. of Tokyo Faculty of Med., in Tokyo, Japan (July 27, 2006); Interview with
Yoshinao Katsumata, Dir., Nat'l Research Inst. for Police Sci., in Kashiwa City, Japan (July 27,
2006).
129. Tatsushige Fukunaga, Shib5 shindan/shitai ken-an shisutemu no genj6 to mondaiten
[Death Determinations and the Postmortem Inquest System], 74 KAGAKU 1298 (2004). In the three
regions with functioning medical examiner systems, autopsies were conducted in 2003 in 24-66%
of deaths classed as "unnatural." In regions without well-functioning medical examiner systems,
autopsies were conducted in far fewer deaths deemed "unnatural"---e.g., Kyoto (1% or less),
Fukuoka (<1%), westem Tokyo (4%). Id. 1299-1301.
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prevalent in these areas. 130
Among the various problems that have been identified with regard to Japan's
death inquest system, the most important is its heavy emphasis on the
investigation of crime, rather than on the determination of non-criminal causes of
death in a fashion that might aid in future prevention.' 31 To be sure, since
professional negligence is a crime, police investigation and judicial autopsy are
possible in cases of suspected malpractice. But the decision about the need for
judicial autopsy, in most of the country, is made by law enforcement personnel
(such as a detective or police surgeon) rather than by a qualified pathologist. If a
judicial autopsy is carried out, it is performed by a forensic pathologist who may
lack sufficient expertise in examining non-criminal death causes. Often, neither
the family nor the hospital can obtain the autopsy results in timely fashion, if at
all. 132 In most of Japan, if a family seeks a non-judicial inquiry into a death from
a suspected iatrogenic cause, the autopsy may well be carried out at the same
hospital where the death occurred, raising concerns about impartiality. 133 And in
some regions that lack a medical examiner system, the family must often foot the
bill. 34 If the medical facility itself seeks to carry out a hospital autopsy to
130. Fukunaga, supra note 129.
131. See, e.g., Fujimiya, supra note 112, at 156; Toshihiro Suzuki, Iry6 jiko-shi kensh6
shisutemu o kangaeru [A System for Investigating Accidental Medical Deaths], 1st International
Forum on Patient Safety, Tokyo, Japan (Jan. 23, 2006) (on file with author); Ken-ichi Yoshida,
Eibei-ken shokoku ni manabu iry5 kanren-shi todokede/chrsa no kin-mirai [Notification and
Review of Medical Practice-Associated Deaths in Japan: Lessons for the Near Future from Anglo-
American Countries], 1 st International Forum on Patient Safety, Tokyo, Japan (Jan. 23, 2006) (on
file with author).
132. Hisako Takeichi, Ken-ichi Yoshida & Kazuto Inaba, Shih6 kaib ni okeru izoku e nojrh6
kayi no mondaiten [Problems of Disclosure of Judicial Autopsy Information to the Bereaved], 595
HOGAKU SEMINA 76-80 (2004); Yoshida, supra note 115, at 127; supra notes 119-120 and
accompanying text.
133. In Aichi prefecture (Nagoya), for example, consented autopsies are performed at a different
hospital than the one where the death occurred. See SHIROYAMA ET AL., supra note 124, at 5. This
practice of switching autopsy sites, which prevails in Osaka prefecture as well, is designed in part
to mitigate possible family concerns that the autopsy report might be part of an internal cover-up.
See, e.g., SUZUKi, supra note 19, at 57 (suspecting hospital deception in the Tokyo Women's
Medical University Hospital case, the family refused consent to hospital autopsy).
Legitimate family concerns about colleague-protective autopsy reports are by no means
confined to Japan. See Kevin E. Bove & Clare lery, The Role of Autopsy in Medical Malpractice
Cases, II. Controversy Related to Autopsy Performance and Reporting, 126 ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY
LABORATORY MED. 1032, 1035 (2002) (noting U.S. cases generating suspicion of concealment
"intended to provide protection to a colleague").
134. See Fujimiya, supra note 112, at 149, 153; Fukunaga, supra note 129, at 1300, 1302
(describing family payment responsibility in Yokohama and surrounding Kanagawa prefecture, and
implying that in other prefectures the situation is similar); Nakane, supra note 115, at 111.
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determine the cause of death, it must obtain the family's consent-often no easy
task135-and bear the expense itself.
136
In sum, Japan's death inquest system has provided little assistance in
elucidating iatrogenic harm and ascertaining possible preventive measures.
Neither medical circles nor families bereaved could confidently rely on the
system's effectiveness in support of medical safety.
The year 2004 was a particularly stormy one for Japanese medicine and
health policy administration. As the year dawned, the patient safety enterprise
was a ship scarcely out of port. The dimensions of the medical error problem
were uncertain, its causes not well specified, and approaches to ameliorating its
effects scattershot and unfocused. The number of civil malpractice filings was
mounting, 37 but peer review of physicians for patient-endangering practices was
ill-developed and administrative discipline virtually nonexistent. In April 2004,
the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the CEO of Hir6 Hospital for
failing to notify police of the "unnatural death" there. 138 Notifications to police of
medically related "unnatural deaths" had increased eight-fold from 1998 to 2004
(Figure 1),139 as many physicians and hospitals, confused by contradictory
guidelines about Article 21 's proper scope and no doubt seeking to avoid the fate
of the Hir6 Hospital chief, chose to err on the side of caution and send
notifications whenever circumstances raised the possibility of professional
negligence. 40 But the death inquest system that these notifications set in motion
135. See Fujimiya, supra note 112, at 148. Often, after the long, complicated process involving
police officers and a police surgeon's examination, the family simply desires to take the remains
away for mourning rituals, rather than subject the corpse to autopsy. See Yoshida et al., supra note
33, at 805.
136. 2008 Interview with Yoshida, supra note 117.
137. See sources cited supra note 27.
138. See notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
139. Iryd jiko, jiken todokede 200-ken toppa - keisatsuchd matome, sakunen 35% z6
[Notifications of Medical Accidents, Incidents Top 200, 35% Increase from Last Year - Police
Agency Study], NIHON KEIZAI SHiMBUN, Apr. 30, 2004, at 30 (increase from thirty-one in 1998,
before the notorious Yokohama switched-patient-surgery and Hir6 Hospital cases, to 255 in 2004).
This enumeration included reports of injuries as well as deaths. The number of formal police
investigations opened and cases sent to prosecutors on the basis of these notifications jumped from
nine in 1998 to ninety-one in 2004, remaining roughly at that level since then. NAT'L POLICE
AGENCY, supra note 47.
140. Hatanaka, supra note 120. Despite this eight-fold increase, it is likely that only a small
proportion of medical practice-associated deaths were reported to police. See SAKAI, supra note 26
(estimating that adverse events occur in 6% of all hospitalizations).
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FIGURE 1: Medical Accidents Reported to Police and Cases Police Sent to Prosecutors, Japan, 1997-2007
Source: National Police Agency, lry5 jiko kankei todokede-to kensO no ido, rikken s~chisu (Trends in Reports
of Medically Related Cases and of Cases Sent to Prosecutors] (2008) (on file with author).
offered little basis for confidence that iatrogenic harm would be discovered,
much less prevented. In the midst of these inauspicious circumstances, the
"Model Project" was conceived and fashioned.
Ill. THE "MODEL PROJECT" AND THE PROPOSED NATIONAL PEER
REVIEW SYSTEM
A. Inception and Operation of the Model Project
Japan's medical leaders deplored intensified police involvement in the
monitoring of medical practice, but also felt keenly the weakening of public trust
in medicine and understood the need for clearer accountability in the handling of
medical accidents. Four medical specialty societies, representing internists,
surgeons, clinical pathologists, and forensic pathologists, issued a joint
declaration in April 2004 calling for the creation of a new system to conduct
reviews of possibly iatrogenic deaths, inform the parties of the facts found, and
offer preventive solutions.14' The proposed new entity would be staffed by
impartial experts and would be separate from the police.1 42 The idea appealed to
other medical groups, allowing them to paper over (at least temporarily) their
differences in support of the concept of what came to be called "third party" (dai-
san-sha, i.e., independent both of the hospital at which the accident occurred and
141. Joint Declaration, supra note 53.
142. Id
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of the patient and family) review. 143
The health ministry, its medical safety office understaffed and beset with
difficulties in the operation of the accident reporting system, 144 saw the proposal
as an opportunity to move safety efforts forward and agreed to fund the effort on
a five-year trial basis, perhaps to serve as a model for a nationwide peer review
system. The Ministry of Justice and the National Police Agency adopted a stance
of implicit acquiescence, giving up none of their jurisdiction to enforce the laws
relating to medical crime and making no definitive public commitment to change
any practices, but content to allow the experiment to proceed without
hindrance.
145
The health ministry launched the "Model Project for the Investigation and
Analysis of Medical Practice-Associated Deaths" in September 2005, initially in
four regions, expanded to eight as of this writing. 146 The Model Project (moderu
jigy5) works in the following manner. 147
When a patient dies in circumstances possibly related to medical
management, the hospital may apply to the region's Model Project office for an
investigation. The initiative must come from the hospital, not the patient's
family, though the family's consent is necessary. 148 Cases falling within the
143. Nihon igakkai kamei no omo na 19 gakkai no ky6d6 seimei [Joint Declaration of the 19
Chief Societies of the Japanese Association of Medical Sciences] (2004), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/
shingi/2007/08/dl/s081O-6b_0005.pdf.
144. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
145. See Kensatsukan: Kokumin no me tsune ni ishiki [Prosecutors: Always Conscious of the
Public's Gaze], YOMIURI SHIMBUN, May 30, 2006, at 7 (interviewing Prosecutor-General Kunihiro
Matsuo); Ken-ichi Yoshida, Iry5 kanrenshi: Shinry5 k~i ni kanren shita shib5 no ch6sa bunseki
moderu jigy5 - Tokyo chiiki heisei 1 7-nendo no sdkatsu [Medical Practice-Associated Deaths: The
Model Project on Medical Practice-Associated Death: 2005 Summary for the Tokyo Region], 24
BYORI TO RINSHO BESSATSU 535, 536 (2006).
146. In Japanese, the Model Project is styled Shinry0 kdi ni kanren shita shib5 no chOsa bunseki
moderu jigyr. The Project was launched in Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi (Nagoya) and Hyogo (Kobe)
prefectures, and has been expanded to include Ibaraki, Niigata and Fukuoka prefectures and the
Sapporo area in Hokkaido as well. Okayama and Miyagi are the next prefectures targeted for
inclusion. See Shinry6 k6i ni kanren shita shib6 no ch~sa bunseki moderu jigy6 dai-18-kai un'ei
iinkai giji shidai [Reference Materials for the 18th Meeting of the Model Project Steering
Committee] attachments 3-1 to -3 (July 23, 2008), available at http://www.med-
model.jp/download/proceedings 1 8.pdf [hereinafter Model Project July 2008 Reference Materials].
147. The basis for much of the outline of the Model Project's methods in the following two
paragraphs is set out in the website for the Model Project, http://www.med-model.jp (last visited
Dec. 4, 2008). The remainder has been gleaned from interviews with various people familiar with
the project's workings. An English-language summary of Model Project procedures is available in
SHIROYAMA ET AL., supra note 124, at 63-90.
148. The usual explanation for this apparent anomaly is that the hospital management is more
likely to be aware of the existence of the Model Project than the family. Interview with Katsushi
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scope of Article 21, however that scope is understood, must still be reported to
the police. (If, after prompt initial inquiry, the police suspect crime and decide to
proceed with an investigation and judicial autopsy, the case is not submitted to
the Model Project.) Regional offices, each headed by a physician coordinator,
vary somewhat in their approach-the Osaka office always consults the police
before accepting a case, for example, while the Tokyo office sometimes has not
when no Article 21 notification was thought necessary-but in general an
investigation proceeds according to a standard approach.
If the Model Project's regional office accepts the case, the office quickly
assembles a team of three physicians not connected with the hospital-a clinical
pathologist, a forensic pathologist, and a specialist in the field of the patient's
treatment-to conduct a thorough autopsy to determine the cause of death. A
separate "evaluation committee" obtains the patient's medical records, interviews
hospital staff involved in the patient's care, and encourages the hospital to
conduct its own investigation. This evaluation committee includes a member of
the autopsy team, an attorney, and outside medical experts nominated by the
various specialty societies. The evaluation committee prepares a report setting
out the facts of the case, a medical (not legal) evaluation of the course of care,
and conclusions on how the accident could have been prevented. This report,
together with the autopsy report and other relevant material, is shared with both
the family and the hospital, originally by a target date of three months after the
case's submission. After review by the Model Project's Tokyo-based steering
committee, which includes eminent physicians, academics, and attorneys from
both plaintiff and defense bars, a summary of the report is made public, with
names of patient, medical staff, hospital, and location redacted.
Although as a formal matter, the Model Project has nothing to do with
liability claims, the evaluation committee's report is potentially available for use
as evidence in both civil' 49 and criminal litigation. 150 However, it is envisaged
Tahara, Director, Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Office of Medical Safety, in Tokyo, Japan
(June 23, 2006) [hereinafter Interview with Tahara].
149. For discussions of a 2003 Tokyo High Court decision allowing disclosure of part of a
hospital's internal report concerning a patient's death to the patient's family, see Leflar & Iwata,
supra note 15, at 207-08; and Manabu Wagatsuma, lry6 jiko keika hrkokusho no teishutsu gimu
[The Duty to Submit Reports on the Course of Medical Accidents], 183 JURIST 42 (2006).
150. Interview with Tahara, supra note 148. Japanese law, in which judges are the fact-finders,
has few of the restrictions on admissibility of relevant evidence found in common-law systems
relying on juries for fact determinations.
According to a memorandum of understanding between MHLW and the Ministry of
Justice, if the police demand information obtained by a Model Project evaluation committee, the
project managers are "not absolved from the duty [to comply with the police demand]" ("gimu o
manugareru koto de wa nai"). This phrase is sufficiently ambiguous to admit of two
interpretations: one by alarmed representatives of medical groups that police demands cannot be
refused, and another, by Model Project representatives seeking to reassure physicians, that police
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that the formulation of the report may foreclose the need for most civil litigation
and discourage the bringing of prosecutions.151 Suspicions on the part of the
bereaved about what befell the patient are the reason for many lawsuits and
complaints to police. The evaluation committee report clarifies the facts, allaying
these suspicions. With regard to civil claims, where the facts found indicate the
likelihood of a successful claim, it is thought that the evaluation committee's
authoritative report may facilitate a rapid settlement. 152 With regard to criminal
prosecutions, in most cases taken up by the Model Project, the police initially
receive an Article 21 notification and then decline to open an investigation. 53 As
of this writing, police have evinced an attitude of restraint, standing back while
the Model Project evaluations run their course. 154
B. The Model Project: A Tentative Evaluation
As a concept, there is much to be said in favor of the Model Project. The
demands should not be refused but are not legally compulsory. During at least the early period of
the Project's operation, apparently the police did not make any such demands for information.
Interview with Ryrko Hatanaka, Shakai gijutsu kenky-i kaihatsu sent5 [Research Institute of
Science and Technology for Society] in Tokyo, Japan (June 15, 2006) [hereinafter Interview with
Hatanaka].
151. See, e.g., Hikaru Tanaka, Irydjikofuns6 shori seido no drnyli kent5; K~rrsh6 "saiban yori
jinsoku " ni kitai [Study of Introducing Dispute Resolution System for Medical Accidents; MHL W
Expectation: "Quicker than Lawsuits "], ASAHI SHIMBUN, June 29, 2005, at 3.
152. Id.
153. Interview with Akira Maemura, Reporter, Nikkei Shimbun, in Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 13,
2008) [hereinafter Interview with Maemura]; see also Mitsuru Sawa & Seisaku Uchigasaki, Iry5
kanrenshi moderujigy6: Kono 1-nen ofurikaette - Iryd kanrenshi ni kansuru moderujigy5 nijian
o todokedeta bydin no tachiba kara [Looking Back on One Year of the Model Project for Medically
Related Deaths: The Perspective of a Participating Hospital], 108 NIPPON GEKA GAKKAI ZASSHI 89
(2007) (reporting an example of a case at Itabashi Hospital in Tokyo where the hospital initially
notified police, who after initial inquiries determined the case to be non-criminal and referred it
back to the Model Project); Model Project July 2008 Reference Materials, supra note 146, at
attachment I (of 202 hospital death cases in which the Model Project was contacted, only twenty-
three were declined by the Project on grounds that a judicial or administrative autopsy was called
for by the police or medical examiner). In four of the first twenty-three cases submitted to the
Model Project, however, the hospitals made no Article 21 notification. Katsushi Tahara,
Presentation at the University of Tokyo, Shinry6 k~i ni kanren shita ch~sa bunseki moderu jigy6 ni
tsuite [The Model Project for the Investigation and Analysis of Medical Practice-Associated
Deaths] (July 8, 2006) (on file with author).
154. See SHIROYAMA ET AL., supra note 124, at 11 (example of police restraint in Aichi Medical
University Hospital case). Those managing the Model Project have counted on criminal justice
officials to recognize that if evidence gathered through Model Project investigations becomes
fodder for prosecutions of medical personnel, the Model Project would immediately be viewed by
the medical world as merely a tool of the police, dooming the project to utter failure.
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quality of the case reviews, on the whole, is likely superior to those typically
undertaken in the past: three experts from different fields participate in each
autopsy and are joined by other specialists on the evaluation committee. 5 ' The
fact that the reviews are conducted by outside experts, typically of high
reputation, brings objective, up-to-date knowledge to bear on the review
process. 156 This also insulates the process from widespread public suspicion of
internal self-protection generated by the string of hospital cover-ups exposed
over the last several years. Heavy police involvement is avoided, absent
exceptional circumstances. 57 The gain in transparency is dramatic: information
gathered in the Model Project review is made available in detailed form both to
the family and to the hospital, although the summary released to the public is less
comprehensive. 158 The evaluation committee's specific recommendations for
quality improvement should assist the formulation of particularized preventive
measures against future injury, especially if the recommendations are widely
circulated. The trustworthiness of the evaluation committee reports may prove to
facilitate speedy extrajudicial redress for deserving families.
However, the Model Project got off to a somewhat rocky start, and case
uptake has not met original expectations. MHLW aimed to conduct 200 autopsies
during the first year of the project's operation.15 9 In fact, over the first 2% years
only seventy cases had been undertaken by the project, a rate of just twenty-five
cases per year. 16 The reasons for the low case uptake are complex. Cooperation
from hospitals in the participating regions is uneven. In part, this is because the
Model Project's existence was at first little known to physicians and hospital
administrators, and its purposes were poorly understood.'16 Some physicians and
155. Putting members of the rival specialties of clinical pathology and forensic pathology on the
job together should also have the long-term effect of diminishing the tribal antagonism between the
two groups.
156. See Judy Kinkelaar Ring & Barry Slotky, Independent Review Supports Transparency, 5
PATIENT SAFETY & QUALITY HEALTHCARE 48, 48 (2008).
157. See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
158. For summaries of cases completed through July 2008, see Model Project July 2008
Reference Materials, supra note 146, at attachment 2.
159. MODEL PROJECT CENT. OFFICE, SHINRYO KOI NI KANREN SHITA SHIBO NO CHOSA BUNSEKI
MODERU JIGYO: HEISEI 18 NEN-DO JIGYO JISSHI HOKOKUSHO [REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE
MODEL PROJECT FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE-ASSOCIATED
DEATHS FOR THE YEAR 2006] 26 (2007), available at http://www.med-
model.jp/download/downloadjigyoul8.pdf. This number may have been set on the high side by
MHLW personnel to justify an adequate budget. Interview with Maemura, supra note 153.
160. Model Project July 2008 Reference Materials, supra note 146, at attachment 1. Of seventy
cases undertaken, only fifty-seven reports have been completed and submitted to families and
hospitals as of this writing. Id
161. Tetsu Yamaguchi, Address at the 106th Annual Meeting of the Japan Surgical Society:
lj6shi no todokede to iry6 k6i ni kanren shita shib6 no chrsa bunseki modem jigy6 [Unnatural
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hospitals, concerned that reports produced by Model Project evaluation
committees might be used by police as evidence of medical crime,' 62 may have
withheld cases from the project for that reason. As noted above, applications to
submit cases to the Model Project for review must come from hospitals, not from
aggrieved families (though family consent is necessary). While this stricture may
have been understandable as an initial means of encouraging hospital
participation, it has tended to rule out cases in which hospitals judge that their
interests would be adversely affected by outside review. Then as the project
progressed with relatively few cases submitted, hospital administrators may have
found no compelling trend to invoke the project's process, no herd to follow.' 63
A second set of reasons for the Model Project's slow start relates to family
concerns. As explained above, there exists a widespread cultural resistance to
consenting to autopsies, which are at the core of the Model Project's method. 164
Also, as a practical matter, family members' first concern is with mourning the
deceased. Often, only after the first stage of grieving do they turn attention to the
possibility that substandard medical care might have occurred; but after
cremation, autopsy is no longer possible.
65
Even though the Model Project has undertaken fewer cases than expected, it
has encountered various difficulties in implementation, and limitations have
become evident that must be addressed before its methods and design can be
expanded to a nationwide scale. First, personnel are stretched thin: the project is
Death Notification and the Model Project for the Investigation and Analysis of Medical Practice-
Associated Deaths] (Mar. 29, 2006).
162. See SHIROYAMA ET AL., supra note 124, at 15; Interview with Hatanaka, supra note 150.
The 2006 arrest of the Ohno Hospital obstetrician, Medical Blunders, supra note 23, lent some
cogency to this concern, since the Fukushima police acted on the basis of the hospital's own
internal self-critical investigation. Sanka-i taih6 ni konwaku; chrshu 1-nen, naze ima - Fukushima
kenritsu bydin/tei6 sekkai misu-shi [Perplexity over Doctor's Arrest in Fukushima C-section Death
- Why a Year After Inquiry?], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Mar. 8, 2006, at 2. However, Fukushima is not one
of the Model Project regions, so perhaps police restraint there was less to be expected.
163. Interview with Dr. Yasuyuki Sahara, Chief, Ministry of Health, Labor & Welfare, Office of
Medical Safety, in Tokyo, Japan (July 15, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with Sahara].
164. See Fujimiya, supra note 112 (reluctance to consent to autopsies); Yoshida, supra note
145, at 535; Y6ko Takeda, K6seir6d6sh6 no shinry6 ni kanren sum shib6 no ch6sa bunseki modem
jigy6 - ch6sei kangoshi (k6din6t,) no shigoto [The Role of the Coordinating Nurse in the MHLW
Model Project on Medical Practice-Associated Death], 1 st International Forum on Patient Safety, in
Tokyo, Japan (Jan. 23, 2006) (on file with author).
During the first two years and nine months of the Model Project, of the 202 cases about
which Project offices were initially contacted, 132 were never undertaken by the Project. The most
common reason (forty-one cases) was the family's lack of consent. Model Project July 2008
Reference Materials, supra note 146, attachment 1. One would surmise that reluctance to allow an
autopsy often contributed to the refusal of consent.
165. Interview with Sahara, supra note 163.
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staffed on a part-time basis by physicians and nurses, almost all of whom have
other full-time jobs. Delays in completing reports have been the rule: The mean
time from submission of a case to explanation of the final report to family and
hospital is 10.1 months, 66 compared to the originally contemplated deadline of
three months. 1
67
Second, the Model Project has been hampered by the weaknesses in Japan's
death inquest system. Currently, the project is confined to regions where
sufficient pathology expertise is available. The number of clinical (hospital)
pathologists is not large, and the count of forensic pathologists is even smaller.
168
In many prefectures there may be only one or two forensic pathologists based at
the local university. 169 The three-specialist autopsy, which is standard practice in
the Model Project, is logistically difficult in these regions and is likely a cause of
delay and unneeded expense even in regions with greater numbers of
pathologists. A more efficient evaluation system should be considered, involving
a less intensive commitment of professional resources, utilization of advanced
imaging technology, and coordination with hospitals' internal investigation
committees in instances where those committees have demonstrated
effectiveness.
Third, variations in standards applied to Model Project case reviews have
engendered significant criticisms. Dr. Tetsu Yamaguchi, CEO of Tokyo's well-
known Toranomon Hospital and a leader of the Model Project's steering
166. MODEL PROJECT CENT. OFFICE, SHINRYO KOI NI KANREN SHITA SHIBO NO CHOSA BUNSEKI
MODERU JIGYO: JIGYO JISSHI HOKOKUSHO [REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE MODEL PROJECT FOR
THE INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE-ASSOCIATED DEATHS] 81-82 (2008),
available at http://www.med-model.jp/download/downloadjigyoul9.pdf None of the completed
final reports met the initial three-month deadline. Id. One survey found the delays to have been a
significant source of frustration to the families involved. Norihiro Nakajima, Hisako Takeichi &
Ken-ichi Yoshida, Moderu jigy6 no hy6ka - Irai iry6 kikan to moderu jigy6 kaib6 jiijisha no shiten
kara [Evaluation of the Model Project from the Perspectives of the Participating Hospitals and
Autopsy Physicians] (2007) (unpublished draft report to MHLW) (on file with author). However, a
leader of the Model Project's steering committee suggested that what is most important is taking
the time to get the reports right, and that the delays may have the positive effect of interposing a
cooling-off period between families and hospitals. Interview with Yamaguchi, supra note 86.
167. MODEL PROJECT CENT. OFFICE, supra note 159, at 10 (noting extension of deadline from
three to six months).
168. There are 1928 hospital pathologists working in Japan. Only 119 forensic pathologists have
been accredited by the Japan Society of Legal Medicine to perform complete autopsies. Inclusion
of graduate students and research assistants who assist with autopsies in university forensic
pathology departments pushes the total up to 253. Dai-3-kai shiin kydmei-t0 kent6kai sank6 shiry6
[The Commission on the Investigation of Causes of Medical Practice-Associated Deaths] 27-28
(2007), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/shingi/2007/06/dl/sO608-4d_0010.pdf. Forensic autopsies are also
performed by non-certified personnel trained in the field. Yoshida, supra note 115, at 125.
169. Interview with Yoshida, supra note 124.
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committee, has emphasized that the training of physicians in reviews of clinical
practices based on consistent standards is a critical need.
70
Fourth, the Model Project addresses only death cases. Its chief impetus was
the medical world's strong distaste for police involvement in the review of
medical practices, and it is usually an Article 21 "unnatural death" notification
that triggers police involvement. The exclusion of cases of serious injury may
have served the useful initial purpose of keeping the number of case reviews
within manageable limits while the enterprise was gearing up. But limiting the
project's scope also means that the benefits accruing from systematic impartial
external peer review, such as objective evaluation, transparency, and building of
public trust,' 71 are correspondingly confined to death inquiries. This restriction
also limits the number and scope of evaluations from which quality improvement
lessons can be drawn. The system would have to be adapted considerably to
handle the much broader range of injury cases.
Fifth, the Model Project lacks explicit statutory authorization. It has been
operating solely under health ministry auspices, relying on voluntary cooperation
by medical providers and patients. If an evaluation committee requests
documentation on a case and the hospital refuses to provide it, the committee
lacks legal power to obtain that information.' 72 This problem requires a
legislative remedy if independent reviews are to be instituted nationwide.
Sixth is the question of long-term funding. The intensive case reviews
conducted in the Model Project require considerable time commitments from
participating experts and the part-time project staff, much of that time
volunteered. The Project's annual budget has increased from an initial ¥102
million (US $0.9 million)'73 to ¥127 million (US $1.1 million) in FY 2008 and
=177 million (US $1.6 million) in FY 2009. 174 But this is a modest budget
indeed. It has sufficed so far, due in part to experts' and staffers' enthusiasm for
participating in a unique endeavor seen as having national significance, and in
part to the unexpectedly small number of cases submitted. But volunteer
enthusiasm is unlikely to sustain such an endeavor in the long run. In an era of
budget and personnel retrenchment in the public sector and financial constraints
in health care,' 75 it will take a substantial political commitment to expand the
170. Interview with Yamaguchi, supra note 86.
171. See Ring & Slotky, supra note 156.
172. Interview with Tahara, supra note 148.
173. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR & WELFARE, HEISEI 17-NENDO YOSAN (AN) NO GAIYO
(KOSEIRODOSHO ISEIKYOKU) [2005 DRAFT BUDGET FOR MHLW HEALTH POLICY BUREAU], available
at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/2005/bukyoku/isei/yosan1.html.
174. E-mail from Dr. Yasuyuki Sahara, Chief, Ministry of Health, Labor & Welfare, Office of
Medical Safety, to author (Aug. 25, 2008) (on file with author).
175. See, e.g., Hoken no gensoku hataraku shikumi ni [Toward a System that Functions on
Insurance Principles], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, June 4, 2008, at 27.
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enterprise nationwide after the five-year trial period ends in 2010.
Finally, and most significantly, lurking in the background of the medical
safety debate is the specter of criminal prosecution. The boundary between cases
subject to prosecution for the crime of professional negligence causing death or
injury176 and cases merely subject to civil liability or administrative sanction
needs clearer delineation. As with any definition of a crime, the line between acts
that are punishable and acts that are not inevitably will be indistinct in some
cases, subject to interpretation and most importantly to prosecutorial discretion.
But for any system of peer review to work, health care personnel need reliable
assurance that ordinary human errors will not invite police interrogation.
Still, the Model Project carries within it the seeds of significant advances. In
the midst of a society still largely structured on a vertical, hierarchical basis
where collaboration among different disciplines is difficult, the project has
collected under one roof physicians from varied and sometimes rival fields of
medicine, nurses, plaintiffs' and hospital lawyers, academics, and health
bureaucrats. These may be strange bedfellows with different motives and goals,
or as the Japanese saying puts it more picturesquely, d5sh5-imu ("same bed,
different dreams"), but they are gaining experience working together in a
common enterprise and creating a model for interdisciplinary cooperation. The
need for a system of impartial review of medical accidents is clearly recognized,
and the Model Project serves as a road test for the creation of such a system.
Through the Model Project experience, recognition of the importance of
reforming the nation's fragmented death inquest system is beginning to grow.
Experience may prove that the expert reports generated by the project's reviews
will lead to smoother resolution of medical injury claims, setting a guidepost for
alternative dispute resolution systems-a guidepost from which other nations
seeking better ways of handling medical injury disputes, including the United
States, may find useful direction.
C. The Proposed National Peer Review System and Its Critics
Pursuant to resolutions passed in 2006 by the Committees on Health, Labor
and Welfare of the Japanese Diet,' 77 a blue-ribbon commission under health
ministry auspices studied the possibility of expanding the Model Project's
176. See supra notes 61, 65 and accompanying text.
177. Sangiin K6seir6d6 Iinkai [House of Councillors Comm. on Health, Labor & Welfare],
Resolution Relating to Proposals for Revision of the Health Insurance Law and the Medical Care
Law, at 21 (June 13, 2006), available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/shingi/2007/06/dl/sO608-
4d_0009.pdf; Shfigiin Krseir6d6 Iinkai [House of Representatives Comm. on Health, Labor &
Welfare], "Anzen de shitsu no takai iry6 no kakuho, jfijitsu ni kansuru ken" ni tsuite ketsugi
[Resolution Concerning the Provision and Assurance of Safe, High-Quality Health Care], at 21
(June 16, 2006), available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/shingi/2007/06/dl/sO608-4d_0009.pdf.
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method of independent expert review of medical accidents nationwide. 78 Their
study included a series of public hearings, public comments on three successive
proposals, and informal negotiations with stakeholders from the health care
sector, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, and patients' groups. 17 9 In June 2008,
the commission proposed new legislation building on the basic structure of the
Model Project, but modifying it to address most of the Project's weaknesses
noted above. The proposed legislation aims to create what would amount to a
national system of peer reviews, external to the hospitals involved, of fatal
medical accidents.
The proposal would establish "regional medical accident review
commissions" to conduct the medical-practice-associated death inquiries that are
currently the responsibility of the police under the infamous Article 21.180 The
purpose of the commissions' reviews would not be to determine liability, but
rather to use the information found in cause-of-death investigations to develop
recommendations for improving medical safety. 18 1 Physicians would be obligated
to report to hospital management cases of inpatient deaths suspected either to
have resulted from medical error or to have been caused by an unforeseen result
of medical treatment, and hospital management in turn, after checking the facts,
would have a duty to notify the regional commissions of these cases.1
8 2
Physicians' and hospitals' existing obligation under Article 21 to notify the
police of such cases would be extinguished. 83 Bereaved families could also
invoke regional commission review, without hospital consent, and regardless of
178. The blue-ribbon commission is the Shinry6 k6i ni kanren shita shib6 ni kakaru shiin
kymei-t6 no arikata ni kansuru kent6kai [Commission on the Investigation of Causes of Medical
Practice-Associated Deaths], chaired by Dean Masahide Maeda of Shuto University Tokyo. Its
proceedings and reports are available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/bukyoku/isei/i-anzen/
kentou/index.html (follow "Shiin kyamei-t6 no kent6 ni tsuite" hyperlinks near the bottom of the
page).
179. Ministry of Health, Labor & Welfare, Shinry6 k6i ni kanren shita shib6 no shiin kyfmei-t6
no arikata ni kansuru kadai to kent6 no h6k6sei [Working Plan on Issues Regarding the
Investigation of the Causes of Medical Practice-Associated Deaths (First Proposal)] (Mar. 2007),
available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/bukyoku/isei/i-anzen/kentou/dl/2a.pdf, Dai-2-ji shian
[Second Proposal] (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/bukyoku/isei/i-anzen/
kentou/dl/2e.pdf; Dai 3-ji shian [Third Proposal] (Apr. 2008), available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/
topics/bukyoku/isei/i-anzen/kentou/dl/2f.pdf.
180. See supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
181. MHLW June 2008 Draft Proposal, supra note 32, arts. 1 & 12, para. 1. The health ministry
proposal's nickname, 'iko-chd," is taken from the name of the medical accident review
commissions, iryd liko ch sakai.
182. Id. art. 32, paras. 2(l), 2(4), 3.
183. Id. art. 33. Article 21 itself would remain on the books, so notification to police of deaths
from violent crimes, suicide, contagious infection, and the like would still be required.
IX:I (2009)
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whether the hospital management had notified the case to the commission.'84 The
regional commissions, composed chiefly of medical experts but also including
non-medical members, would be tasked with reviewing the cases (in cooperation
with but independently of hospitals' internal review processes),185 compiling
reports on the cases, and suggesting prevention measures. The regional
commissions would have the power not only to question health care personnel
involved in the incidents and to conduct autopsies, but (unlike Model Project
evaluation committees) could also compel the production of documents and
reports from the hospital.
186
Hospital management would have an explicit legal duty to explain honestly
to the family the circumstances and causes of the patient's death. 8 7 In cases
involving system errors (in addition to mistakes by individual caregivers),
prefectural governments would be given new authority to impose "improvement
orders" on hospitals. 188 A National Medical Accident Review Commission would
gather reports compiled by the regional commissions, analyze them, and
formulate and disseminate nationwide recommendations for the prevention of
similar accidents in the future.
89
The criminal justice system would still have a role to play under the health
ministry's proposal, albeit a diminished one, since the Criminal Code provision
sanctioning "professional negligence causing death or injury" would remain. 90
The regional commissions would be required to report cases to police in the
following four situations:
1) deaths suspected to have been intentionally caused (e.g.,
184. Id. art. 15. This would expand families' rights compared with the Model Project structure.
Cf supra note 148 and accompanying text.
185. Third Proposal, supra note 179, para. 32. An exception would be made for a category of
large high-level hospitals deemed to have adequate internal review processes, tokutei kin6 by6in.
These hospitals would be authorized to conduct their own case reviews in lieu of regional
commission review, as long as the review team included members external to the hospital. Id.
paras. 33-35.
186. MHLW June 2008 Draft Proposal, supra note 32, art. 17.
187. Id. art. 32, para 1. Some Japanese courts have already determined that such a duty exists as
a matter of contract law, as an implied term of the patient-provider agreement. See, e.g., 1907
HANREI JIHO 112, 124-25 (Kyoto D. Ct., July 12, 2005); 1194 HANREI TAIMUZ 243 (Tokyo D. Ct.,
Jan. 30, 2004), aff'd in relevant part, 1880 HANREI JIHO 72 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 30, 2004) (on
both contract and tort grounds); see also Leflar & Iwata, supra note 15, at 212-13 (describing
cases).
188. MHLW June 2008 Draft Proposal, supra note 32, art. 32, para. 6.
189. Id. art. 4, para. 6.
190. KEIHO [Criminal Code], art. 211, para. 1; see also supra notes 61-65 and accompanying
text.
41
Leflar: "Unnatural Deaths," Criminal Sanctions, and Medical Quality Improvement in Japan
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2009
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
euthanasia);' 91
2) deaths suspected to have resulted from "grave negligence" ('iidai na
kashitsu),192 defined as "extreme deviation from standard medical
care"; 193
3) deaths involving the suspected concealment, alteration, or forging of
medical records with the purpose of covering up the facts; 194 and
4) deaths suspected to have resulted from repeated negligence by a
practitioner who has caused similar medical accidents, or engaged in
other suspected similar serious misconduct. 195
Families could still lodge complaints independently with the police, a right that is
guaranteed under the Criminal Procedure Code. 196 The National Police Agency
has informally agreed, however, to "recommend" to complainants that cases first
be presented to the regional commissions for expert evaluation. 197 In an attempt
to reassure the medical profession, the police agency has also informally agreed
to respect the commissions' evaluations and to carry out its law enforcement
responsibilities using the commissions' conclusions as its primary basis.
98
The health ministry proposal was hammered out through negotiations among
various stakeholders within and outside government, including medical groups,
top Diet members with health policy interests, the National Police Agency, and
the ministries of justice and finance. The proposal has been agreed to in principle
by the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Medical
Association leadership, and it is supported by patients' rights groups.
9 9
191. MHLW June 2008 Draft Proposal, supra note 32, art. 25, para. 1.
192. Third Proposal, supra note 179, paras. 39, 40(3).
193. Id. para. 40(3); MHLW June 2008 Draft Proposal, supra note 32, art. 25, para. 2. The
regional commissions would make case-by-case determinations taking into account factors such as
the size of the health care facility, the geographical environment, the level of experience of the
caregivers, whether an emergency situation existed, and whether the facility had adequate overall
safety systems in place. Id.
194. Id. art. 25, para. 3.
195. id.
196. KEun SOSHO HO [Code of Criminal Procedure], arts. 230-32 (kokuso no kenri).
197. Ministry of Health, Labor & Welfare, Iry6 anzen ch6sa iinkai (kash6) no iken boshfi ni
tsuite [Request for Public Comments on Medical Safety Review Commission Proposal] 11 (2008),
available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/seisaku/dl/05a.pdf [hereinafter MHLW Request for Public
Comments].
198. Id. at 10.
199. See Masafumi Tatematsu & Atsuhiko Hayashi, Iry6 jiko cho5sa no soshiki-zukuri: Giron
IX:I (2009)
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Nevertheless, the proposal sparked a firestorm of criticism and as of this writing
is by no means certain of enactment. The criticisms have come mainly from
physicians and some medical groups, as well as from members of the opposition
Democratic Party of Japan. The chief criticisms of the proposed legislation are
these:
1) The definition of "grave negligence" in the legislation is insufficiently
precise. Practitioners would not know what acts would be considered
illegal. This uncertainty would tend to retard innovative non-standard
practices.
200
2) The regional review commissions constitute an unnecessary expansion
of government. Patients and doctors should work out problems among
themselves, without creation of a new bureaucratic apparatus.
201
3) Reports compiled by the review commissions, and even documents
and interview notes obtained during their investigations, could be
available for use against hospitals and health care personnel in criminal,
civil, and administrative discipline proceedings.
20 2
4) The main beneficiaries of the review commissions' reports will be
plaintiffs' attorneys, who will use the review commissions' reports to
dzume, chfimon aitsugu [Building a Structure for Medical Accident Review: Debate Enters the
Endgame: Demands Pile Up], ASAHI SHIMBUN, May 22, 2008, at 33 (noting positions of various
groups); Iry6ban jikoch6: KinkyO k6kai shimp6 [Emergency Public Symposium on the Medical
Accident Review Commission Proposal], in Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 4, 2008) (statements of patients'
group leaders) (on file with author).
200. See, e.g., Masahiro Kami, Iry6 kaikaku no genzai [Medical Reform Today], 6th Annual
Urology Seminar, in Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 2, 2008) (on file with author). The definition of "grave
negligence" is of concern to many medical specialty societies. Nihon Igakkai [Japan Ass'n of Med.
Sciences], "lry6 no anzen no kakuho ni muketa iry6 jiko ni yoru shib6 no gen'in kyiimei saihatsu
b6shi no arikata ni kansuru shian - dai-3-ji shian" ni kansuru Nihon Igakkai no kenkai [Opinion of
the Japan Association of Medical Sciences on the "Third Proposal Concerning a Medical Safety-
Oriented System for Cause-of-Death Investigations and Prevention of Recurrences of Fatal Medical
Accidents"], available at http://jams.med.or.jp/news/007.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2008)
[hereinafter JAMS Opinion].
201. See, e.g., Kami, supra note 200.
202. Statement of Hirotoshi Nishizawa, President, Zen Nihon By6inkyokai [All Japan Hosp.
Ass'n] (May 12, 2008) (on file with author). According to the health ministry's explanation,
however, interview notes and other groundwork on which final commission reports are based
would not be released to investigatory authorities absent a court order. MHLW Request for Public
Comments, supra note 197, at 11.
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bolster their cases.2 °3
5) The proposal is punitive rather than ameliorative in its methods and
perspectives. It does not eradicate criminal law's intervention into
medical practice. It would accelerate, not retard, "iry65 hdkai," medicine's
collapse.2 °4
Taking account of these criticisms, Senator Kan Suzuki of the Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) put forward a counterproposal, the "Patients' Support Act,"
in June 2008.205 The DPJ proposal has points in common with that of the health
ministry, but differs in important respects.
The focus of the DPJ proposal is not so much on elucidating the causes of
medical accidents and preventing them, as it is on facilitating the resolution of
disputes between hospitals and patients and families. The DPJ proposal would
lodge the responsibility for reviewing medical accidents (serious injuries as well
as deaths) not in regional commissions established by government, as in the
health ministry's plan, but rather in the hospitals themselves.20 6 A key concept in
the DPJ plan is internal mediation: 20 7 hospitals would be required to employ or
203. Kami, supra note 200. The lawyer-bashing tactic draws on U.S. tort reform rhetoric.
204. A common theme of the medical blogs is a criticism of what is said to be the health
ministry proposal's punitive nature. See infra note 217.
205. Iry6 ni kakaru jrh6 no teiky6, s~dan shien oyobi funs6 no tekisei na kaiketsu no sokushin
narabi ni iry6 jiko-t6 no saihatsu bfshi no tame no Iry6 Hr-t6 no ichibu o kaisei suru hrritsu
(kash6) an kosshi shian (tstishr: Kanja shien hran) [Outline of Proposed Act To Amend the
Medical Services Law To Provide Information Relating to Medical Care, Counseling/Support and
Proper Resolution of Disputes, and Prevent Recurrence of Medical Accidents (tentative title); Short
title: Patients' Support Act] (June 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter DPJ June 2008 Proposal];
see also The Democratic Party of Japan, Jaten seisaku 50 [50 Key Policies],
http://www.dpj.or.jp/special/jyuten50/01.html#04 (summary on DPJ website) (last visited Dec. 4,
2008); Kempou38 no burogu, Minshut6 sangiin-iin Suzuki Kan-shi ni kiku: "Iry6 jiko-ch" no
"Suzuki shian" to Kfrrsh6 no kashitsu [Interview with DPJ Senator Kan Suzuki: The "Suzuki
Proposal" for Medical Accident Review Commission and MHLW's Negligence],
http://ameblo.jp/kempou38/entry-10102377584.html (June 2, 2008) (blog interview of Sen. Kan
Suzuki, summarizing key aspects of his proposal and criticizing the MHLW proposal).
206. DPJ June 2008 Proposal, supra note 205, tit. 1, art. 3, para. 2.
207. The standard Japanese phrase is naibu ADR [internal ADR]. A noted proponent of this
concept is Professor Yoshitaka Wada. YOSHITAKA WADA & TOSHIMI NAKANISHI, IRYO
KONFURIKUTO MANEJIMENTO: MEDIEISHON NO RONRI TO GIHO [MEDICAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT:
MEDIATION THEORY AND SKILLS] (2006); YOSHITAKA WADA, IRYO ADR [MEDICAL ADR]
(forthcoming 2009). The use of the American acronym "ADR" in Japanese is an indication that the
Wagatsuma-Rosett idea of harmonious extrajudicial dispute settlement, supra note 10, has never
really penetrated Japanese medicine. The concept of alternative dispute resolution, at least in the
medical context, had to be imported from abroad.
IX:I (2009)
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contract for mediators to "promote understanding of medical care by patients and
families and dialogue with health care providers, and to assist in resolution of
disputes., 20 8 If within-hospital mediation fails and a family rejects the hospital's
explanations or proposed resolution of the dispute, the family would have the
recourse of seeking either an external expert review of the case or external
mediation through a prefectural Medical Safety Support Center.20 9
The DPJ proposal, like the health ministry's, would place on hospitals and
doctors an explicit statutory duty of honest explanation of any adverse events to
patients and families. 210 For prevention of future accidents, reports would go for
analysis and dissemination of recommendations to a designated existing entity,
2 1 1
probably the Japan Council for Quality Health Care.212
208. DPJ June 2008 Proposal, supra note 205, tit. 1, art. 2, para. 3. The contrast between the
DPJ's emphasis on internal hospital ADR as the key resolution point for medical injuries and the
health ministry's emphasis on external, government-sponsored expert review calls to mind the
debate in the United States over what some call the privatization of justice-the trend to outsource
conflicts once the bailiwick of the state-erected judicial system to private-sector dispute resolution
mechanisms. However, if private ADR fails, under the DPJ proposal the family could still invoke
public processes, in contrast to private arbitration foreclosing access to U.S. courts by the losing
party.
209. Id. tit. 1, art. 3, para. 3. The meaning of the condition for seeking external review or
mediation, viz. that the family "cannot accept" (nattoku dekinai) the hospital's response, depends
on an interpretation in context of the ambiguous concept nattoku (acceptance, satisfaction).
"Nattoku" can include a range of acceptance behaviors from satisfied agreement to a grudging,
resigned willingness to go along with what is proposed because nothing better is worth trying to
obtain in the circumstances. The use of the negative, nattoku dekinai, in the DSP plan sets the
trigger for external review outside the latter, "grudging willingness" end of the range. This means
that in effect families would invoke the external review or mediation mechanisms only if they find
the hospital's framing of the dispute and proposed resolution of it intolerable. Critics charge that
families, dependent on information and interpretations provided by the hospital and on the
assistance of a hospital-employed mediator, would often be buffaloed in this setting. E.g., Interview
with Toshihiro Suzuki, in Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 8, 2008) (a high-profile plaintiffs' attorney).
Nothing in the DPJ plan would foreclose families from seeking assistance from private
attorneys or filing complaints with police. In this respect the DPJ and health ministry proposals do
not differ.
210. DPJ June 2008 Proposal, supra note 205, tit. 3, arts. 2-3. For a summary of court decisions
on the issue, see supra note 187.
211. DPJ June 2008 Proposal, supra note 205, tit. 1, art. 3, para. 4.
212. A friendly commentator described the DPJ's proposed accident analysis and recurrence
prevention plan as an "expanded image" of the Japan Council for Quality Health Care's existing
medical accident information collection system. Sanka iry6 no kore kara [Obstetrical Medicine's
Future] blog, http://obgy.typepad.jp/blog/2008/06/post-1341-26.html (June 13, 2008) [hereinafter
Obstetrical Medicine's Future]. Cf Outline of Medical Accident Information Collection Project,
supra note 96 (website describing the Council's project).
The health ministry's proposal, by contrast, would lodge the quality improvement
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A key selling point of the DPJ proposal, to the medical profession at least, is
that it would abolish Article 21 outright. No longer would physicians or hospitals
have the obligation to report medical practice-associated "unnatural deaths" to
the police. 21 3 Police involvement would presumably be triggered only if patients
or families lodged complaints or whistleblowers leaked damaging allegations.
214
The DPJ proposal, however, like the health ministry's proposal, would not
change the Criminal Code's underlying sanction against professional negligence
causing injury or death.215
Although much of the medical establishment supports the health ministry's
proposal, 21 6 a groundswell of opposition, fed by influential medical blogs, 217 on
the part of individual physicians has touched off an avalanche of protests to Diet
members, forcing them to pay attention to an issue that most had ignored in the
past. The blogs and protests are manifestations of an insurgent antiregulatory
movement within the medical profession, sparked by the 2006 arrest of the Ohno
Hospital obstetrician.21 8 This movement aims at halting the asserted "collapse" of
Japanese medicine by removing or minimizing criminal law's intrusion into
medical practice and reducing the health ministry's oversight role, as well as by
providing greater support to doctors practicing obstetrics and emergency
medicine.219
information dissemination function in the proposed National Medical Accident Review
Commission. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. This decision likely reflects
dissatisfaction with the Japan Council for Quality Health Care's past performance on this score.
213. DPJ June 2008 Proposal, supra note 205, tit. 3, art. 4.
214. Police and prosecutors are likely to oppose this feature of the DPJ proposal, since it would
eliminate a key source of information about truly unacceptable hospital practices. Interview with
Maemura, supra note 153.
215. See Obstetrical Medicine's Future, supra note 212 (quoting Sen. Shinya Adachi, M.D., a
key supporter of the DSP proposal).
216. The Japan Medical Association, representing doctors owning private-practice clinics, has
endorsed the health ministry proposal, although there is dissent among the ranks. See Tatematsu &
Hayashi, supra note 199. The Japanese Association of Medical Sciences, an umbrella organization
of 105 medical specialty societies, polled its members in spring 2008; of fifty-two responses, thirty-
five member societies favored the health ministry plan, seven favored it with conditions, five were
opposed, and five gave other responses. JAMS Opinion, supra note 200.
217. See e.g., Medical Research Information Center Merumaga, http://mric.tanaka.md (last
visited Dec. 4, 2008); Lohas Medical Blog, http://lohasmedical.jp/blog (last visited Dec. 4, 2008).
A list of approximately eighty other blogs, e-mail magazines, and the like can be found on the
website of the Association to Prevent the Collapse of Perinatal Medicine (Shaisanki iry6 no h6kai o
kuitomeru kai), http://plaza.umin.ac.jp/-perinate/cgi-bin/wiki/wiki.cgi?page=%A5%EAA5%
F3%A5%AF# p8 (last visited Dec. 4, 2008).
218. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
219. Interview with Masahiro Kami, Professor, Univ. of Tokyo Inst. of Med. Sci., in Tokyo,
Japan (Aug. 4, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with Kami].
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The politics surrounding the rival proposals on medical accident review have
been unusual. 2 0 The opposition DPJ controls the upper house of the Diet, so the
ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) cannot ram the health ministry's proposal
through without compromise. The health ministry itself, never a heavyweight
among Japan's governing agencies, has been further weakened by public wrath
over recent episodes of bureaucratic incompetence. 221 Yoichi Masuzoe, the
popular LDP Minister of Health, Labor, and Welfare222 whose selection as
Minister was based partly on his televised criticisms of bureaucratic overreaching
and underperforming, actually linked informally with DPJ critics and put the
brakes on his own ministry's first two proposals in 2007, in effect blocking their
submission to the Diet.22 3 Patients' rights groups, normally critics of the health
ministry and the ruling LDP, are backing the health ministry's current
proposal; 224 meanwhile, members of the opposition DPJ (a party many of whose
leaders come from a progressive background with a history of supporting
victims' group causes), are advancing a proposal seen by many as threatening
injured patients' rights with medical provider domination. 225
How this complex political configuration will be resolved is unclear at the
time of this writing, as Prime Minister Fukuda's September 2008 resignation and
the upcoming general election have left Japanese politics in a state of flux. 226 But
there appears to be sufficient room for adjustment of opposing positions that
some revised proposal, incorporating aspects of the two rival plans, should be
feasible. Both schemes agree on this: the importance of ascertaining, to the extent
possible, the causes of potentially iatrogenic harm and honestly informing
patients and families of the course of events. The two proposals differ only with
regard to the structure of ascertainment. And the recent highly publicized
220. See id; Interview with Masahide Maeda, Dean, Shuto Univ. Tokyo, in Tokyo, Japan (Aug.
7, 2008) (Chair of the blue-ribbon study commission described in supra note 178 and
accompanying text) [hereinafter Interview with Maeda]; Interview with Akira Maemura, Nikkei
Shinbun medical and legal affairs reporter, in Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 13, 2008); Interview with
Toshihiro Suzuki, Professor, Meiji Univ. Law Sch., in Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 8, 2008).
221. Chief among these episodes is the mismanagement of the nation's pension records by the
branch of the ministry responsible for social security. See Mari Yamaguchi, Social Security
Scandal Shakes Japan, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/02/AR2007090200146_2.html.
222. Masuzoe, a former University of Tokyo professor, samurai drama actor, and popular TV
talk show figure, led the Liberal Democratic Party ticket nationally in votes received during the last
Upper House election. He belongs to none of the LDP factions.
223. Interview with Kami, supra note 219; Interview with Maeda, supra note 220.
224. Tatematsu & Hayashi, supra note 199.
225. See supra note 209 (criticisms of internal hospital ADR proposals).
226. See Hisako Ueno & Bruce Wallace, Japan Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda Resigns, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2008, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-fukuda2-
2008sep02,0,7865629.story.
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acquittal of the Ohno Hospital obstetrician has lent considerable impetus to
efforts to enact a national medical accident review system centered on
professional analysis rather than criminal investigation. 27
D. Significance for Health Policy in Western Nations
What messages might the recent Japanese experience offer to health policy
and medical jurisprudence specialists in the United States and other Western
nations? Differences in institutional and legal structures and in cultural
assumptions counsel caution in drawing lessons from another nation's journey.
Still, the following points may be worthy of consideration.
1) Those concerned about the onerous impact of tort law on medical practice
might take comfort from the scarcity of police investigators in the hospital
corridors of Western countries, and from the absence of physicians and nurses in
police detention cells.
2) When the public distrusts the integrity of hospital case review processes
and doubts the candor of providers' explanations of adverse events, pressure will
mount for external review of those events. Likewise, to the extent providers (and
their insurers) are not forthcoming about compensation, apology for injury, and
recurrence prevention measures, external review may be sought. When judicial
processes are easily accessible, are perceived as trustworthy and fair, and
function swiftly and efficiently, they fulfill this external review function
admirably. But neither American courts litigating medical malpractice, nor
Japanese courts litigating medical crime, have met these ideals.228 Wariness about
courts' proper functioning has led both American and Japanese societies to
consider alternative means of adverse event examination and dispute resolution.
The Japanese experiment with impartial expert review, external to the
hospital involved, is a response to highly publicized error episodes shaking much
227. See, e.g., Kensaku Fujiwara, Yukiko Takanashi & Atsuko Kobayashi, Kensatsugawa no
ronri hitei: Sanka-i ni muzai [Prosecutors' Theory Rejected, Obstetrician Acquitted], YOMIURI
SHIMBUN, Aug. 21, 2008, available at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/iryou/news/iryou-news/20080821-
OYT8T00310.htm (quoting health minister Masuzoe's intention to present a bill in the
extraordinary Diet session then anticipated during autumn 2008); Iryrjiko kaimei: shikumi-zukuri
kyamu [Urgent Task: Building a Structure for Medical Accident Review], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN,
Aug. 20, 2008, at 1 (calling for medical review system by a "neutral and specialized entity");
Editorial, Medical Safety Panels Should Be Set Up Soon, DAILY YOMIURI, Aug. 21, 2008, at 4
(same); Sankai-i muzai: iry6 saisei no kikkake ni [Obstetrician Not Guilty: Opportunity for the
Rebirth of Medicine], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Aug. 21, 2008, at 3 (same).
228. Indeed, public dissatisfaction with the judiciary in general is higher in the United States
than in Japan. See John 0. Haley, Litigation in Japan: A New Look at Old Problems, 10
WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL. 121, 139 (2002) ("Public opinion polls... routinely show
that [Japanese] judges, along with the police and prosecutors, enjoy unusually high levels of public
trust..., especially when viewed in comparison to other countries, including the United States.").
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of the public's faith in medicine's integrity, when Japanese medicine's self-
policing mechanisms were seen to have failed. Conditions in other nations'
health care systems differ, and the torque of reform drives ameliorative efforts in
divergent directions-more centralized in Japan, for example, and more
pluralistic in the United States. 229 Still, the concept of case review by expert
panels staffed chiefly by independent medical specialists along with
representation from other pertinent disciplines (such as law, engineering, systems
management, and others), without foreclosing recourse to the courts, is attractive
in the context of any modem medicolegal system.
3) Ultimately, this author hopes that compensation for harm suffered by
patients whose condition is worsened by medical treatment, and the cost of
needed medical care for those patients, will be provided on an "avoidable harm"
or "preventable harm" basis rather than on a fault basis, at least for some
designated categories of medical accidents. 230 Sweden currently operates such a
2312323system. Virginia 32 and Florida233 have taken limited steps in that direction
regarding no-fault compensation for families of infants with neurological damage
at childbirth, and Japan is in the final preparatory stages of launching an
analogous birth damage compensation system. 234 Neither Japan nor the United
229. For instance, both the Japanese health ministry's proposal for a few regional medical
accident review commissions reporting to a single national commission and its system for reporting
adverse events to the Japan Council for Quality Health Care are far more centralized in nature than
the system of Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs) to be set up under the Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to 299b-26 (Supp. 2005). Under the Department
of Health and Human Services' final rule implementing the 2005 law, PSOs numbering in the
hundreds or thousands will apply for certification to receive adverse event and near-miss
information developed by health care providers, analyze it, and disseminate accident-prevention
suggestions, without necessarily undertaking any evaluation of the care provided. See Patient
Safety and Quality Improvement, 42 C.F.R. §§ 3.10 to 3.552 (2008).
230. For excellent overviews of proposals to overhaul the medical tort system along these lines,
see Randall R. Bovbjerg & Laurence R. Tancredi, Liability Reform Should Make Patients Safer:
"Avoidable Classes of Events" Are a Key Improvement, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 478 (2005);
Michelle M. Mello et al., "Health Courts" and Accountability for Patient Safety, 84 MILBANK Q.
459 (2006).
231. See, e.g., Susan Hershberg Adelman & Li Westerlund, The Swedish Patient Compensation
System: A Viable Alternative to the U.S. Tort System?, 89 BULL. AM. C. SURGEONS 25 (2004).
232. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (2007 & Supp. 2008).
233. Fla. Stat. Ch. 766.301 to .316 (2005 & Supp. 2008); see also Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank
A. Sloan & Peter J. Rankin, Administrative Performance of "No-Fault" Compensation for Medical
Injury, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71 (1997) (examining the operation of the Virginia and Florida
systems).
234. See Editorial, Compensation for Cerebral Palsy, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008, at A2,
available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed2008Ol 10a2.html; Japan Council for Quality
Health Care, Sanka iry6 hosh6 seido [The Japan Obstetric Compensation System] (2008), available
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States is yet at the happy stage of expanding this concept to cover a broader
range of medical injuries. But review of adverse events by impartial experts is at
the core of all such endeavors. The method of impartial expert review of medical
practice-associated deaths, which Japan's Model Project has adopted, is one
guidepost along the road to this type of systemic reform.
CONCLUSION
The Japanese health care system inflicts preventable injury on its patients at
rates that are likely commensurable with those measured in Western nations.
Awareness of the problem burst on Japan in 1999 and 2000, contemporaneously
with the release of To Err Is Human235 by the Institute of Medicine in the United
States, as reports on a series of health care calamities at famous hospitals graced
the front pages of Japanese newspapers. Most of these disasters were not
accompanied by the apologies to victims or harmonious resolution of disputes
through which the conventional wisdom holds that Japan smoothes its social
frictions. Instead, they were exposed despite cover-ups and attempts to deceive
patients and families.
The story of medical error demonstrates once more that the trajectories of
national responses to common crises are often strongly affected by each society's
legal and institutional structure. In contrast to most Western nations, in Japan the
criminal law has played a significant role in the regulation of harmful medical
practice, much to the consternation of the medical profession.
Criminal law's prominence in Japanese regulation of medical error, seldom
remarked on outside Japan, 236 is in part attributable to the structure of the law
itself. Professional negligence causing death or injury is a crime, as is the failure
to notify police of "unnatural deaths," now interpreted to encompass deaths from
medical mismanagement. In part, however, the role played in Japanese medicine
by criminal law has been a matter of faute de mieux: police and prosecutors
initiated criminal investigations and prosecutions because no other social
mechanisms were adequate to police the medical world. The Japanese criminal
justice system filled an accountability vacuum.
Reacting to the loss of public trust in medicine brought about by repeated
revelations of error and deception, and dismayed by the prospect of police
intrusion into medical matters, leaders of the Japanese medical profession
presented a plan for impartial expert review of medical practice-associated
deaths, with reports provided to the family, the hospital, and the public. Funded
by the health ministry, this five-year "Model Project" commenced in 2005 in
several prefectures. The project attempts to overcome numerous structural and
at http://www.sanka-hp.jcqhc.or.jp/outline/index.html (description of the compensation system).
235. To ERR is HUMAN, supra note 1.
236. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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institutional obstacles, including a splintered, underdeveloped, and secretive
death inquest system. Despite a slow start, the project has the potential to bring a
new level of transparency to the medical world, to identify and disseminate ways
of preventing future harm, and to facilitate the speedy resolution of medical
disputes, reserving the intervention of the criminal justice system for only the
most hideous cases. The project represents an attempt at wedging ajar a portal
historically closed in Japan, illuminating some of the medical profession's
weaknesses long kept in shadow, and encouraging the kind of quality
improvement in medicine for which other sectors of Japan's economy have long
been famed.
Building on the Model Project's methods, Japan's health ministry has
proposed what amounts to a national system of peer reviews, external to the
hospitals involved, of potentially iatrogenic hospital deaths. The opposition party
has countered with a rival proposal, the political scene is in flux, and at this
writing neither proposal has become law. But the highly publicized arrest,
detention, and prosecution of an obstetrician for a patient's death during
childbirth in rural Fukushima prefecture, and his acquittal in August 2008, seem
to have crystallized Japanese public opinion around the view that the criminal
justice system is too heavy-handed a tool for proper regulation of medical
quality. A systemic reform based on the concept of impartial non-criminal
external review of medical accidents, if enacted, could serve as one guidepost for
other nations seeking to design improved structures for compensation and
prevention of medical injury.
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